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Abstract
Scores of cities across the country face devastating financial crises,
and the COVID-19 pandemic has brought even more to the brink. But
economically distressed municipalities have few places to turn for help.
Saddled by rising unemployment, weak tax bases, and state law
limitations on deficit spending and debt assumption, they generally
cannot spend their way out. And as conditions deteriorate, mobile capital
and labor move to greener pastures, further hollowing out the cities they
leave behind. With state and federal lifelines tenuous at best, offers by
large developers to redevelop an area of the city can thus appear to be the
path to salvation: a shot in the arm that will raise property values, create
jobs, attract residents, expand the tax base, and generate further interest
in similar projects.
Given their outsized importance, private redevelopment projects
warrant sustained scholarly attention. But nearly all of the attention they
receive focuses on just two aspects of the issue: the doctrinal scope of
local power to engage in them, and the law and policy steps necessary for
them to achieve an efficient and just allocation of resources. These
questions, though certainly important, overlook something central. Even
a plan that promises a just and efficient distribution of resources may
disappoint on both scores if things fail to pan out as hoped. That is, there
is always risk that a project will fail to deliver on its promises—or worse,
fail to get off the ground entirely. And where there is risk, there is
someone who must bear it.
This Article shines a new spotlight on the problem of risk allocation
in redevelopment projects. It observes that, as most of these projects are
pursued, it is the municipalities that bear nearly all of the risk of failure,
while developers are permitted to bear almost none. And it develops a
normative theory of redevelopment risk allocation, arguing that this
prevailing allocation of risk is neither efficient nor just but instead
perversely increases the chance developments will fail and leave
municipalities even worse off than they had been before. Accordingly,
this Article theorizes and details novel ways in which three areas of law—
takings, land use, and municipal finance—can work to shift risk to
developers and more closely tie developers’ fortunes to those of
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municipalities. Finally, it draws on and advances state and local
government law and scholarship by evaluating the political economy of
reallocating redevelopment risk, concluding that attempts focused at the
local level will inevitably come up short. State or regional
implementation of this Article’s proposals, however, could chart a
promising path forward.
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INTRODUCTION
Municipal redevelopment projects are gambles. They are gambles by
developers, who are betting that these projects will generate profits. They
are gambles by local governments, which are betting that these projects
will generate jobs, attract spending, expand the tax base, increase
property values, and so on. And they are gambles by residents, who are
betting—or are simply asked to hope—that public money that could have
been spent on priorities like roads or schools or parks will not go to waste
acquiring land and offering enticing tax abatements to developers instead.
Like all bets, these projects involve risk. But as they currently tend to
be pursued, developers often bear very little of that risk.1 Municipalities,
not developers, frequently pay to acquire the necessary land.2 When
1. See infra Part I (discussing case studies).
2. See, e.g., Charles V. Bagli, 45 Wall St. Is Renting Again Where Tower Deal Failed,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/08/nyregion/45-wall-st-is-renting-
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developers do reimburse those municipalities, they often get to do so for
pennies on the dollar.3 And the tax breaks and other incentives developers
routinely receive from municipalities generally require no consideration
in exchange and often demand very little in the way of benchmarks or
obligations with respect to local job creation or revenue enhancement.4
Developers are therefore permitted to dramatically limit their exposure,
to be underinvested in the success of these projects, and to have
insufficient incentives to see them through and actually generate
promised benefits, especially when doing so necessitates further
investment. But while the most that developers stand to lose is their
heavily subsidized initial investment, the economically distressed
localities and residents these projects purport to help all stand to suffer—
in the short term by having their homes condemned and their resources
diverted, and in the long term by development failures that leave their
communities with holes in the ground that sit empty for years.5 So, when
things go wrong—as they often do—developers can cut their losses and
walk away, while municipalities and taxpayers are left holding the bag.
This result is perversely inequitable because the localities and
residents who bear this risk are poorly situated to do so. As noted, the
localities are often in dire straits financially, and because of state law
constraints, are often limited in their access to credit.6 And since much of
the taxpayers’ wealth is built up in the equity in their homes—the very
thing at risk of loss if a project goes south—they are not positioned to

again-where-tower-deal-failed.html [https://perma.cc/QT8X-HQ6W]; Mesa Project is Reshaped,
Sweetened Hotel, Sports Complex Taking on New Form, ARIZ. REP., July 20, 1999, at 1; John J.
Bukowczyk, The Decline and Fall of a Detroit Neighborhood: Poletown vs. G.M. and the City of
Detroit, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 61 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit: Private Property and Public Use,
88-MAR MICH. B.J. S18, S21 (2009); Bagli, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Gosselin, Were $60 Million of Incentives for Pfizer Worth It?,
HARTFORD COURANT (Feb. 6, 2011), https://www.courant.com/business/hc-xpm-2011-02-06-hcpfizer-incentives-0207-20110206-story.html [https://perma.cc/EB8B-8JS8]; Andrew Rice, NYSE’s
Chairman Unplugs His Plans For a New Exchange, OBSERVER (Dec. 3, 2001), https://observer
.com/2001/12/nyses-chairman-unplugs-his-plans-for-a-new-exchange/ [https://perma.cc/U6YSXL7C].
5. See sources cited supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., Nadav Shoked, Debt Limits’ End, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1239, 1255 (2017)
(“[State laws] sometimes block localities from accessing requisite credit, . . . . force governments
to pay higher interest rates, generate administrative expenses, [and] give birth to deals
suboptimally structured from a public finance perspective . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); Daniel P.
Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 591, 619 (2011)
(“[L]ocal governments in the twenty-first century have very limited financial resources.”);
Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The
Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1301, 1315–16 (discussing
forms of debt limitations).
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diversify away that risk.7 Moreover, due to the well-known difficulties of
exit and foot-voting, along with other pathologies of local democracy,
residents are frequently stuck and subject to the whims of developers.8
By contrast, the developers bear very little of the risk despite being
comparatively well-situated to do so. They have other resources and can
diversify their portfolios, they have easier access to credit, and most of
all, they hold more of the cards in terms of determining the degree to
which a project delivers to the community its promised benefits.9 They
can decide whether and how much to invest, whether and when to walk
away, whether to hire in the numbers they have promised, and whether to
move more or fewer corporate functions (or which ones) to that location
so that they generate more or less taxable income and therefore more or
less revenue for the community.10 And while economic shocks and
unexpected market developments can doom even the most well-thoughtout and honestly committed projects, it is again the developers that are
best positioned to bear those risks.
There is, therefore, a significant mismatch between who presently
bears the risk, and who ought—and is most able—to do so. Simply put,
the prevailing allocation of risk is inequitable and leaves developers with
precisely the wrong set of incentives. These problems of incentives and
equity—and the record of failure that is associated with both—are grist
for the anti-development arguments made by libertarian and other
property-rights advocates who generally oppose the seizures of private
property often called for by these projects.11 But it would be a mistake to
take that more categorical position if municipalities could achieve oftennecessary economic revitalization while minimizing the risks to
taxpayers.12 Fortunately, they can.
7. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1059 (2008)
(noting that a home is “typically the single largest [investment] in the household’s portfolio, and
it is often heavily leveraged” (footnote omitted)).
8. See infra Section III.A.
9. See infra notes 164–71 and accompanying text; cf. Gosselin, supra note 4 (noting that
even though Pfizer brought jobs to Connecticut, the temporary boost in jobs was short-lived once
Pfizer decided to close its New London facility despite the city’s investment).
10. See infra notes 164–71 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 543
(2006) (arguing that “[t]he only way to mitigate [equity and incentivization] concerns sufficiently
is by banning economic development takings altogether”); Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown:
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use,
2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (2004) (arguing for a “categorical ban on economic
development takings”); infra note 28 (discussing the litigation perspective of Institute for Justice).
12. See, e.g., Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1704, 1706 (2007) (“[A] flat prohibition on the use of eminent domain to assemble land from
numerous owners to allow large-scale, financially profitable projects is highly problematic on the
policy level.”).
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This Article theorizes and details novel ways in which three areas of
law—takings, land use, and municipal finance—can work, short of
pulling the plug on economic redevelopment projects altogether, to shift
the risks of failure to the developer.
First, consider takings. When land must be assembled for a project,
landowners are either bought out in consensual sales or are forced out
through the government’s exercise of the eminent domain power.13 But it
is often municipalities that pay these land acquisition costs, and when
developers in turn receive this land, they generally are not made to
reimburse municipalities in full for it.14 This leaves developers
underinvested and municipalities overleveraged.15 By contrast, requiring
developers to pay all land acquisition costs in full at the outset—a
requirement that is, as yet, nearly unheard of—would reverse that
misallocation of risk and reward, and would better incentivize developers
to see their investment pay off.16
Second, on the land use law front, municipalities have more tools than
they frequently use.17 For one, they can shift the risk of long-term
promises going unmet to the developers that make those promises by
embedding specific job creation and revenue enhancement goals in
development agreements and community benefits agreements.18 They
can also enter into what this Article calls “takings agreements”: binding
contracts providing that, in exchange for the exercise of the eminent
domain power, the developer agrees to specific terms that result in a fair
spreading of risk. And going a step further, localities can employ their
power to extract money from developers for risk-shifting purposes.19
When distressed municipalities subsidize development projects, that
almost necessarily means redirecting finite taxpayer money from other
uses like parks and roads on the premise that the investment will pay off.
Exactions from developers to fund those services can be deployed to
insure against the danger that the investment does not pay off and, again,
gives the developer added reason to see that it does.
Finally, on the municipal finance front, municipalities often extend to
developers significant tax abatements and other sweeteners to induce
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
14. See infra Part I (collecting examples).
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Section II.A.
17. See infra Section II.B.
18. See, e.g., Dorothy D. Nachman, When Mixed Use Development Moves in Next Door:
Finding a Home for Public Discourse and Input, 23 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 55, 79–97 (2012)
(discussing current scope of development agreements); Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine,
Understanding Community Benefits Agreements, 24 PRAC. REAL EST. LAW. 19, 19–21, 30–33
(2008) (same for CBAs).
19. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 596, 606 (2013).
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them to develop.20 But these financial rewards tend to be front-loaded and
unmoored from any particular development goals, so municipalities are
obligated to lose revenue even on projects that wholly fail to meet those
goals.21 Imposing performance-linked benchmarks and withholding tax
abatements until further into the future of the project places the risk of
short-term failure squarely on the shoulders of the developer and better
incentivizes the developer to make good on its promises. While these
strategies are employed occasionally to varying degrees, the below
analysis highlights much untapped potential.22
While this Article builds on and draws novel connections between
work in all three of these fields, it also contributes a necessary new
perspective. The existing literature tends to approach takings and
development problems primarily if not solely in terms of achieving
efficient and just allocations of resources—that is, by attending to who
will end up with what once a project is completed and delivers on its
promises.23 This is no doubt very important. But this Article spotlights a
neglected dimension of the problem: the significance of achieving
efficient and just allocations of risk. After all, the allocation of risk
influences behavior and incentives and can therefore affect the chances
that a project that promises efficient and just allocations of resources
ultimately achieves them. Moreover, risk allocation matters even when it
does not affect the probability of success. Attending to who absorbs the
consequences of failure, whatever its source, is critical to any
conversation about equity and justice in economic redevelopment.
In short, bringing to life the traditional efficiency and justice concerns
that animate this literature means examining those values not only in
terms of resources, but also in terms of risk. This Article offers a
normative theory of redevelopment risk-allocation. It argues for the
necessity of shifting more risk—of erroneous ambition, flawed
execution, lack of commitment, and the slings and arrows of exogenous

20. See infra Part I (collecting examples).
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Section II.C.
23. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious
Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 408 (2000) (“If there is some measure of coherence or
consensus in this vast and diverse body of judicial opinions and scholarly commentary, it is that
the purposes of just compensation are essentially two: efficiency and distributive justice.”);
Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 528 (2009); Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 578–89 (2001) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky,
Givings]; Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 53–56 (2003) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky, Of Property]; Daryl J. Levinson, Making
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
345, 388–89 (2000); Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law
of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 997 (1999).
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shocks—onto the party best able both to do something about these forces
and to bear their consequences.
Finally, this Article draws on and advances state and local government
law and scholarship by evaluating the political economy of reallocating
redevelopment risk. It concludes that attempts to do so solely at the local
level will inevitably come up short. After all, among the likely reasons
why municipalities do not already drive harder bargains with developers
is that, thanks to their economic distress and their need to compete with
neighboring municipalities for scarce opportunities, they lack the
leverage and political will needed to do so.24
All is not lost, however, because intervention by states or regional
arrangements can avoid this troubling race to the bottom. Specifically,
while still leaving many of the details to local discretion, state or regional
policymakers can incentivize or even require municipalities to implement
the takings, land use, and municipal finance risk-reallocation strategies
advanced in this Article. Doing so would equally tie competing localities’
hands for their own good, preventing them from making the bad deals
that they currently see no other choice but to make.25 It would also
mitigate the problems of potential capture of local government by deeppocketed, repeat-play developers.
In contrast to a number of other troubling areas in which some states
are currently racing to preempt localities based on little more than
political disagreement,26 this is an area where state preemption or
regional cooperation along the lines set out here would be more justifiable
and would break through pathological dynamics of local democracy and
of interlocal competition. Indeed, because it is relatively less likely that
developers would write off entire states or regions—and forfeit otherwise
attractive human capital or other location benefits—the result would be
that, wherever they build in those states or regions, they would be unable
to play municipalities against one another and would be locked into more
equitably bearing the risk of failure. Accordingly, they would be better
incentivized to work to avoid that failure.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I tells the stories of five failed
development projects and draws out the risk-allocation roots and riskallocation consequences of those failures. Part II develops the theoretical,
doctrinal, and practical risk-reallocation potential of three areas of law.
24. See infra Section III.A (discussing pathologies of local development decisionmaking).
25. See infra Section III.B (exploring authority for and benefits of state and regional
intervention).
26. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128
YALE L.J. 954, 963–74 (2019); Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L.
REV. 1163, 1169–83 (2018); Alan Greenblatt, States Preempt Cities Almost to the Point of
Irrelevance, GOVERNING (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.governing.com/now/States-Preempt-CitiesAlmost-to-the-Point-of-Irrelevance.html [https://perma.cc/W4UK-DLUA].
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First, as a matter of takings law, developers could be obligated to pay for
land acquisition in full. Second, as a matter of land use law, developers
could be subjected to exactions and other binding agreements that require
them to meet certain economic goals, offset opportunity costs, and
guarantee certain short-term deliverables. Third, as a matter of municipal
finance law, developers could be given monetary and tax incentives
characterized by long tails that delay vesting and by benchmarks that
reward achieving goals and penalize failure. Finally, Part III surfaces the
particular pathologies of local democracy that create obstacles to
effective risk-reallocation along these lines at the local level. It then
contends that state-level coordination and preemption, as well as regional
cooperation, can overcome these structural impediments and therefore
represent a more promising path forward.
I. DEVELOPMENT FAILURES
This Part explores five stories of development projects gone wrong.
The aim here is not to demonstrate that all such projects are doomed to
fail, though there is ample evidence that development projects far too
often fall short of generating promised community benefits.27 Rather, this
Part seeks to describe the presence and allocation of the risk of this sort
of failure. That is, it examines who bears the risk that a project will fail
to deliver on its short- and long-term promises: job creation, enhanced
tax revenue, economic revitalization, and even simply completion of the
development itself.28
27. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local Economic
Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 332 (2010) (“Cities appear not to gain back what they put
in, either in the short term or the long term . . . .”); Yoonsoo Lee, Geographic Redistribution of
US Manufacturing and the Role of State Development Policy, 64 J. URB. ECON. 436, 436–37, 448
(2008) (finding little evidence that development incentives are effective); DAPHNE A. KENYON,
ADAM H. LANGLEY & BETHANY B. PAQUIN, LINCOLN, INST. OF LAND POL’Y, RETHINKING
PROPERTY TAX INCENTIVES FOR BUSINESS, 3 (2012), https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/
files/pubfiles/rethinking-property-tax-incentives-for-business-full_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/75FD5E5B] (offering evidence that development incentives have a “generally poor record in promoting
economic development”); TIMOTHY J. BARTIK, W.E. UPJOHN INST. EMP. RSCH., A NEW PANEL
DATABASE ON BUSINESS INCENTIVES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OFFERED BY STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 116 (2017), https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1228&context=reports [https://perma.cc/5QU9-4AFS] (finding that “in
many cases [incentives] are excessively costly and may not have the promised effects”).
28. Institute for Justice (IJ), an organization that, among other things, opposes private
development takings writ large, has compiled a list of development failures that it uses in its
advocacy efforts. See Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council
v. Detroit, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 651, 677 (2005) (calling IJ “[t]he only legal organization
that has aggressively challenged the use of eminent domain for economic redevelopment”);
CASTLE COALITION, REDEVELOPMENT WRECKS: 20 FAILED PROJECTS INVOLVING EMINENT
DOMAIN ABUSE 1 (2006), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Redevelopment-Wrecks.pdf
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A. Detroit, Michigan
One of the most frequently told stories of development failure is that
of the General Motors (GM) plant project in Detroit’s Poletown
neighborhood.29 By the end of the 1970s, Detroit’s economy was in
tatters, just like much of the Rust Belt. This decline had begun decades
earlier, but the cumulative result was a massive loss of people, jobs, and,
along with both, tax base.30 As this death spiral picked up steam, “[f]ully
one-fifth of the city’s residents left in the 1970s (and another 15% were
to depart in the 1980s),” and by 1980, the city’s unemployment rate was
18%.31 In particular, the auto industry, long the lifeblood of the Detroit
economy, was shrinking catastrophically and hemorrhaging jobs.32
In a desperate attempt to save jobs and bolster the economy, Coleman
Young, then Mayor of Detroit, asked GM “what it would take for it to
expand employment in Detroit.”33 GM said it would build a new Cadillac
plant “if the City could provide a 500-acre site, with adequate road and
rail transportation, other improvements, and tax abatements, in a short
time frame.”34 The Poletown neighborhood was the only one that ticked
all of the boxes, so “GM insisted that the City condemn the area and turn
it over to the company by May 1981.”35 The promised bargain was this:
The city would spend $200 million to condemn the land, pay the owners
the required compensation,36 tear down the buildings, prepare the site,37
and extend to GM “a twelve-year, fifty percent tax abatement . . . worth
[https://perma.cc/TUE9-VJGN]. But whereas IJ’s mission is, as they put it, to “stop eminent
domain abuse” by governments, see INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, JOIN THE FIGHT TO STOP EMINENT
DOMAIN ABUSE, https://ij.org/action/join-the-fight-to-stop-eminent-domain-abuse/ [https://perma
.cc/H2TY-F3XC], this Article aims its sights on reducing developer abuse of government power
and largess. Moreover, while this Article shares the premise that these projects too often fail, it
does not share the premise that private development takings are unconstitutional or bad policy, or
that they are even the cause of the problem. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; infra
Section II.A.
29. See Somin, supra note 11, at 1006 (calling the Poletown story “by far the most widely
publicized and notorious”).
30. Poletown, supra note 3, at S18–19.
31. Id. at S19. Unemployment among Black residents of Detroit was “nearly double that
rate.” Id.
32. Id. at S18–19 (“[B]y the end of the 1970s, Chrysler, a major Detroit employer, was in
desperate straits . . . . [I]n January 1980, Chrysler closed Dodge Main and, yet again, thousands
of highly paid jobs vanished.”).
33. Id. at S19.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”); MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2 (“Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation therefore being first made or secured in a manner prescribed
by law.”).
37. Poletown, supra note 3, at S19.
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a substantial 60 million dollars.”38 In exchange, GM would make a nonbinding promise to create 6,000 jobs directly at the plant, “4,000
temporary construction jobs, over 20,000 jobs created by the multiplier
effect of the plant, and appreciable long-term revenues from those
workers’ city income tax payments.”39
Residents of Poletown sued, arguing that the condemnation could not
proceed because it was not being pursued for a “public use” as required
by Michigan’s constitution.40 The Supreme Court of Michigan rejected
this argument, holding that a “public use” exists where the public
“benefit[s]” from the condemnation and, further, that “alleviating
unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the community”
constitute public benefits.41
Detroit thus proceeded to acquire the necessary land—at a total cost
of closer to $300 million rather than the $200 million estimate.42 And yet,
when the city sold the assembled land to GM, the latter paid just $8
million for all of it.43 Now, in contrast to many of the other stories
discussed in this Part, it should be noted that most of the funding for
Detroit’s acquisition of the land did not come directly from Detroit
taxpayers, but from federal grants.44 Some scholars like Professor
William Fischel argue that the city’s choices were distorted precisely
because it was not writing its own checks.45 But as the rest of this Part
suggests and as other scholars have observed, cities frequently make the
same choices when they are spending their “own” money, or at least their

38. Bukowczyk, supra note 2, at 61.
39. Id.; see Somin, supra note 11, at 1012–13 (emphasizing that “neither the city nor GM
had any legal obligation to actually provide the 6,000 jobs, or the other economic benefits they
had promised”).
40. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich. 1981)
(per curiam), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004); MICH.
CONST. art. X, § 2. A 2006 amendment provides that “‘[p]ublic use’ does not include the taking
of private property for transfer to a private entity for the purpose of economic development or
enhancement of tax revenues,” id., but that was not the law at the time. See Poletown, supra note
3, at S22.
41. Poletown Neighborhood Council, 304 N.W.2d at 457, 459. That court later overruled
this decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
42. Poletown, supra note 3, at S21.
43. Id.
44. William A. Fischel, Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants
Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 4 MICH. ST. L. REV. 929, 943 (2004); see
Bukowczyk, supra note 2, at 61.
45. Fischel, supra note 44, at 944–46 (citing “the willingness of the federal government to
insulate Detroit voters from fiscal consequences of the Poletown project”).
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taxpayers’ money, as they do when they are spending the federal
government’s money.46
As easy as it is to see the problem here as simply being that Detroit
gave GM an exceptionally generous sweetheart deal, the deeper issue is
less the staggering handout of resources and more the risk-free nature of
that handout. That is, not only was GM made to contribute next to nothing
up front, but it was not required to undertake any commitment to produce
the community benefits that motivated residents to accept the deal in the
first place.47 It was thus given little incentive to contribute anything to the
project’s broader success in the community. So, GM faced no
consequence when the plant opened behind schedule and only provided
“about half of the hoped-for jobs”48—all while likely eliminating
thousands of existing jobs in the neighborhood.49 And the touted spillover
effects? Fischel reports that when he visited the site in January 2004, over
twenty years after the project’s start, he saw “no sign” that the area was
“rejuvenating itself as a result of the plant’s continued operation.”50
Indeed, before the project, the area was by many accounts a “thriving,
ethnically diverse community.”51 After, “GM’s new plant and parking lot
occupied most of the neighborhood.”52 Disappointing though this
outcome is, it ought not be a surprise, since Detroit did not give GM much
of a reason to work towards anything better for the local residents who
sacrificed so much.
Of the stories in this Part, Poletown might be among the closest to a
success purely insofar as the development happened at all. But that says
more about how low the bar is than about how successful this project was
at delivering on its promises. And, ironically, the fact that the project was
actually completed meant that Detroit was on the hook for the millions in
tax abatements it offered GM—again, despite the paltry return to the city
and its residents. Simply put, to borrow Fischel’s words, “[I]f it had been
46. See Somin, supra note 11, at 1018 (similarly arguing that Fischel “is perhaps too quick
to assume that cities would not undertake [these projects] in the absence of outside subsidies”);
Levinson, supra note 23, at 420 (“[G]overnment cares not about dollars, only about votes.”); infra
notes 190–97 (discussing same); see also Section III.A (discussing pathologies of local
government decision making).
47. See Somin, supra note 11, at 1013.
48. Poletown, supra note 3, at S21; Somin, supra note 11, at 1013.
49. See Bukowczyk, supra note 2, at 68 (noting “the 9,000 area jobs” that were projected
to “disappear when the site was cleared”); Somin, supra note 11, at 1017–18.
50. Fischel, supra note 44, at 936.
51. Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 23, at 569; see Bukowczyk, supra note 2, at
62 (discussing neighborhood vitality). But see Fischel, supra note 44, at 941 (“Poletown was not
a prosperous area . . . . [and] not a socially integrated community.”).
52. Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 23, at 569; see Fischel, supra note 44, at
937 (“The GM facility is sealed off from the rest of the community by berms and fences and is
accessible by gates that make it clear that the general public is not welcome.”).
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intended as a catalyst for urban renewal, the Poletown project would be
a flop.”53
B. Las Vegas, Nevada
In late 1989, a Japanese developer named Masao Nangaku, who at the
time owned the Dunes Resort in Las Vegas, set his sights on a new project
he called Minami Tower, a thirty-five-story office complex in downtown
Las Vegas.54 The City Council, “dazzled” by Nangaku’s “blueprint for
urban renewal” in an area far less vibrant than the Strip four miles south,
agreed to exercise its power of eminent domain to condemn and pay for
the two blocks of land he would need.55 In addition to clearing out and
compensating the small businesses and property owners that had been in
place, the city reportedly “donate[d]” an additional $5 million to the
project.56 Construction began with the digging of a large hole for the
tower’s foundation.57
Within two years, Nangaku’s financing dried up.58 The Dunes Casino
went bankrupt, Nangaku’s real estate holdings in Japan lost value, and
the Minami Tower project fell apart.59 Nangaku’s personal losses were
significant—by some reports, he had poured as much as $35 million into
the project.60 But so were the city’s losses. It had spent millions of dollars
on acquiring the land and contributing to the project.61 It lost income and
sales tax revenue from businesses that no longer existed.62 And, for
almost six years, it was left with nothing but a massive hole in the
ground.63 The hole could not have been particularly good for the
surrounding businesses and their property values, or in turn for the tax
revenue the city was earning on those surrounding parcels.
Today, the parcel is the location of the Lloyd D. George Federal
Courthouse and a parking lot roughly the size of a square block. 64 ThenSenator Harry Reid of Nevada said at the 1997 groundbreaking for the
courthouse project that its completion “will have turned the Minami pit
53. Fischel, supra note 44, at 936–37.
54. Karl Schoenberger, Japanese Tap Out in Las Vegas, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 15, 1993),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-03-15-mn-415-story.html [https://perma.cc/VN
2B-45JE].
55. Id.; Nevada, USA TODAY, Nov. 16, 1989, at 05A.
56. Nevada, supra note 55.
57. Schoenberger, supra note 54.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Nevada, supra note 55, at 05A.
62. See id.
63. Schoenberger, supra note 54.
64. Carri Geer, Officials Break Ground for Courthouse, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Nov. 18, 1997,
at 3B.

2021]

REALLOCATING REDEVELOPMENT RISK

1093

into a model for municipal planning.”65 And in 2000, he crowed that
“[t]here’s nothing that’s been done in recent years that is more important
in terms of redevelopment.”66 Relative to a pit in the ground, that is
almost certainly true. But relative to what had been on the land in 1989,
or what Nangaku’s project could have been, or what some other private
enterprise could have built, things are much more complicated.
First, besides perhaps the courthouse cafeteria, the building generates
little municipal revenue in the form of sales taxes. Second, given that
there was already a federal courthouse across the street, there is little
reason to think this one created many new jobs. Third, the federal
government pays no real estate taxes.67 And finally, perhaps most
significant of all, the city donated the land to the federal government.68
In sum, when things went south in Las Vegas, the city and its
taxpayers were left holding the bag and absorbing years of lost tax
revenue. While the city managed to stop the bleeding by donating the
land to the federal government for a tax-exempt courthouse, it never
recouped the money it spent to acquire the land or the revenue it lost in
the interim, and it settled for a project that itself generates negligible to
no revenue.
C. Mesa, Arizona
In the late 1990s, a Canadian developer named Malcolm Ross
proposed to build a resort, water park, ice rink, and hotel complex called
Mesa Verde in downtown Mesa, Arizona.69 The city agreed to spend over
$7 million to condemn and acquire the necessary land in the hopes of
“lur[ing] tourists and locals to a dormant downtown.”70 From the very
start, however, Ross had trouble securing funding. Indeed, even before
Ross’s company had demonstrated proof of financing, the city not only
spent the money on the land and gave Ross more time to come up with
the funding, but it also “increased [its] subsidy for the project, adding five
years to a 15-year sales tax rebate” and permitting the project to keep and
use 1% of the city sales tax revenue it generated for twenty years.71
Within months, Ross returned to the city to say he would need yet more
65. Id.
66. Carri Geer, New Courthouse Crucial to Downtown Revitalization, LAS VEGAS REV. J.,
Apr. 28, 2000, at 2A.
67. See, e.g., Maureen Mahoney, Federal Immunity from State Taxation: A Reassessment,
45 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 695–707 (1978). Offices and courthouses are also not subject to the federal
payments in lieu of taxes program. See 31 U.S.C. § 6901(1); KATIE HOOVER, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
RL31392, PILT (PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES): SOMEWHAT SIMPLIFIED 7–8 (2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31392.pdf [https://perma.cc/TGY8-6K55].
68. Geer, supra note 64, at 3B.
69. Local Builder Picked for Resort in Mesa, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 18, 1999, at 1.
70. Mesa Project is Reshaped, supra note 2, at 1.
71. Id.
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time to show proof of financing; the city gave him another nine months,
with each of those nine months costing Ross an additional $5,000.72
Somewhat astonishingly, two months later, the city awarded the
financially challenged developer another bid to redevelop an additional
nearby parcel.73 Soon after, drawn to the possibility of job creation, a
better business climate, and increased property values in surrounding
blocks,74 the city handed Ross “tax breaks of about $150,000 a year for
eight years” on that other project.75
By October 2000, with financing still elusive, Ross asked for and
received from the city yet a third extension on Mesa Verde until June
2001—with the same $5,000 per month penalty.76 But by March 2001,
both projects collapsed when Ross finally conceded the money was not
coming.77 The city and its residents were left with twenty-seven acres of
condemned, vacant downtown land—a “barren collection of dirt lots
intersected by roads”78—along with the bill for the land acquisition and
all of the tax revenue those parcels could have earned in the meantime,
less the paltry monthly penalties the city had imposed.
That land sat vacant for the next nineteen years—providing no
housing, stimulating no business, generating no jobs, contributing no tax
revenue, and doing nothing to increase the property values of surrounding
neighborhoods. Finally, starting in 2018, the city began to try again, this
time not with “a ‘silver bullet’ project, one so remarkable and beautiful
that it would justify Mesa’s taking homes in the area through eminent
domain,” but instead with something similar to what was there before: a
“very nice, special neighborhood, mostly residential in nature, that would
complement downtown rather than compete with it.”79 In the summer of
2020, over twenty years after the original project commenced, Mesa

at 1.

72. Hotel Developer Again Gets More Time on Financing, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1999,

73. Canadian Developer Adds Redoing of Bank One Building to Mesa Mix, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Jan. 27, 2000, at 3.
74. Downtown Plan Gets City Dollars, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 30, 2000, at 1.
75. Mesa Eyes Tax Break for Downtown Project, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 19, 2000, at 1.
76. Project Seeking Time, Money Asks City for Delay to Gain Financing, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Oct. 21, 2000, at 1; Downtown Ups and Downs: Canadian Developer Drops Redevelopment
Projects, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 8, 2001, at 1.
77. Downtown Ups and Downs, supra note 76, at 1.
78. Jim Walsh, Mesa Rekindles Hopes to Revive Long-dormant Downtown Site, E. VALLEY
TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.eastvalleytribune.com/news/mesa-rekindles-hopes-to-revivelong-dormant-downtown-site/article_5d21ae50-9cf1-11e8-8042-f3fddfbd5f2c.html [https://perma
.cc/QY9H-EAZ6].
79. Id.
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began negotiating new memoranda of understanding with residential
developers.80
D. New York, New York
In the summer of 2000, Rudy Giuliani, then Mayor of New York City,
and Richard Grasso, then Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), planned a massive project: an over $1 billion relocation of the
stock exchange to a new facility across the street from its historic
location.81 The NYSE had been complaining for years that it needed more
space, and it had threatened to move to New Jersey if the city did not help
secure that space.82 So, the city got to work acquiring the necessary land.
It contracted to purchase some of the necessary property in consensual
sales, and it also exercised its power of eminent domain to condemn an
apartment building at 45 Wall Street.83 The rent-stabilized tenants at 45
Wall Street sued to challenge the taking as lacking the requisite public
use under the New York State Constitution,84 but the Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court concluded that the city had sufficiently
demonstrated the public benefits of keeping the NYSE in the Financial
District—including the “increased tax revenues, economic development
and job opportunities as well as preservation and enhancement of New
York’s prestigious position as a worldwide financial center.”85
It looked like all was a go from a development standpoint: the NYSE
would stay in the Financial District, land would soon be cleared, a new
fifty-one-story office building would be built, the exchange floor would
move into the building, and the office space above it would be leased to
a big-name corporate tenant soon to be identified.86 The city spent about
$6 million moving tenants out of 45 Wall Street,87 to say nothing of tens
of millions of dollars in deposits on purchase contracts on the other
properties and in planning and engineering expenses.88 The plan as a
whole would have also called for the city, along with the State of New
York, to extend $160 million in tax breaks to the NYSE.89
Tragedy struck, however, in the form of the terrorist attack on the
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. It became impossible to
80. Jim Walsh, Slowly but Surely, Mesa Getting a New Downtown, E. VALLEY TRIB.
(July 13, 2020), https://www.eastvalleytribune.com/news/slowly-but-surely-mesa-getting-a-new
-downtown/article_90d17964-c2f2-11ea-bd9c-4b82a6f6f4de.html [https://perma.cc/DN46-7QUW].
81. Rice, supra note 4.
82. Bagli, supra note 2.
83. See In re Fisher, 730 N.Y.S.2d 516, 516 (App. Div. 2001).
84. Id.; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
85. In re Fisher, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 516–17.
86. Rice, supra note 4.
87. Bagli, supra note 2.
88. See id.; Rice, supra note 4.
89. Rice, supra note 4.
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locate a developer interested in building a new skyscraper in Lower
Manhattan, and commercial tenants also became scarce.90 Grasso himself
“abruptly changed course, saying the idea of a 900-foot skyscraper above
the symbolic center of American commerce is not ‘salable’—meaning no
developer would want to build it and no tenant would want to work in
it.”91 Word started to leak that Grasso had never fully committed to the
project, vacillating even before the September 11 attacks, all while the
city was writing multi-million-dollar checks to support his project.92
Finally, when the city—facing enormous budget problems of its own and
under the new leadership of Giuliani’s successor, Michael Bloomberg—
demanded that the NYSE contribute a larger share of the project’s costs,
the NYSE walked away from the project for good.93 Once again, the city
was left holding the bag.94
And quite an expensive bag it was. By the city’s own estimates,
“unwinding the ill-fated project [would] cost taxpayers about $109
million.”95 By comparison, the NYSE “spent about $10 million.”96 The
city also ended up returning the properties to their original owners,
forfeiting the deposits on the contracted purchases and paying $1 million
a month in rent on the condemned apartment building at 45 Wall Street
until the building was fully leased again.97 In contrast to the other stories
in this Part, at least the city was not left with a hole in the ground or barren
tracts of land. And at least the project was scuttled before the city moved
ahead with its planned $950 million bond offering—a significant amount
of debt the city would have had to service.98 But that only underscores
that the city spent over $100 million to end up back where it started, with
the NYSE trading floor still in its historic headquarters in Lower
Manhattan.99

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Bagli, supra note 2.
94. Compare Rice, supra note 4 (“[City officials are] insisting that if the skyscraper is
scrapped, the stock exchange should make up the difference in cost.”), with Bagli, supra note 2
(reporting two years later that the stock exchange did not make up the difference in cost).
95. Bagli, supra note 2.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Rice, supra note 4.
99. See Yun Li, NYSE to Temporarily Close Floor, Move to Electronic Trading After
Positive Coronavirus Tests, CNBC (Mar. 18, 2020, 8:05 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/
18/nyse-to-temporarily-close-trading-floor-move-to-electronic-trading-because-of-coronavirus
.html [https://perma.cc/A85B-CRBE] (noting that the exchange has been located in its present
“location at 18 Broad St. in lower Manhattan [since] 1903”).
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E. New London, Connecticut
It is not possible to study development failures without including
perhaps the most infamous story of all: the redevelopment of the Fort
Trumbull neighborhood in New London, Connecticut. New London,
once a busy port and site of substantial naval installations, had been in
significant economic decline through the 1980s and 1990s.100 In 1996,
the federal government closed the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, a
major employer in the city.101 By 1998, the unemployment rate was twice
as high in New London as in the rest of Connecticut, and the city’s
population had shrunk to the size it had been in 1920.102 Hoping to
revitalize the city, state and local officials devoted their attention to a
massive redevelopment plan anchored by a Pfizer research facility.103 The
idea was that the Fort Trumbull Pfizer facility would employ as many as
2,000 people,104 and would, in turn, attract additional new businesses that
would employ still more people, draw in higher-earning residents, and
expand the tax base.105 Planners also hoped to “make the City more
attractive and to create leisure and recreational opportunities on the
waterfront” and in the neighborhood’s to-be-improved park.106
The bargain with Pfizer was similar to the bargains in the other stories.
For example, Pfizer was given “a 10-year, 80 percent property tax
abatement from New London, valued at about $30 million”—half of
which would be reimbursed by Connecticut and the other half of which
New London would forfeit altogether.107 The state also extended to Pfizer
“$20 million in sales and use tax exemptions” designed to encourage
Pfizer to buy locally, and $5.5 million in construction grants. 108 Some
contemporaneous local news reports refer to a total of “more than $118
million in financial incentives and other amenities” being “offered by the
state and the city to convince Pfizer to build in New London,”109 but
whatever the precise total offered or spent, it is clear that these direct
incentives amounted to many tens of millions of dollars.
Pfizer was also the beneficiary of eminent domain, though not in quite
the same way as the other projects discussed here. Rather than acquire
land for Pfizer’s facility, which Pfizer had already assembled, New
100. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Ted Mann, Pfizer’s Fingerprints on Fort Trumbull Plan, THE DAY (Oct. 16, 2005),
https://www.theday.com/article/20051016/BIZ04/911119999 [https://perma.cc/W25M-V7RD].
105. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473.
106. Id. at 474–75.
107. Gosselin, supra note 4.
108. Id.
109. Mann, supra note 104.
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London moved to purchase or condemn the rest of the Fort Trumbull
area.110 This neighborhood, adjacent to a sewage treatment plant that
emitted unpleasant odors, was “a hodgepodge of industrial properties,
warehouses, and old, small homes . . . sandwiched between Amtrak rail
lines on the west and the abandoned naval base on the north.”111 It was
primarily the acquisition, destruction, and planned redevelopment of that
territory that came out of taxpayer coffers.112 And on that score, taxpayers
ultimately spent in the neighborhood of $80 million.113
This exercise of eminent domain was controversial. As in Poletown,
some of the property owners sued, arguing that the taking was
unconstitutional because it was not for the “public use” required by the
Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.114 And as in Poletown, they lost,
this time with the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Kelo v. City of New
London115 that a “public use” is established by a “public purpose” for the
taking and, further, that courts must “define[] that concept broadly” to
include economic development and must defer “to legislative judgments”
as to the measures that will achieve that goal.116
And while Pfizer had publicly insisted that it made no demands with
respect to the surrounding area—that the city made its own independent
choices about what to do with Fort Trumbull—and while the courts in the
Kelo litigation found or accepted that to be true,117 there is some evidence
that Pfizer had at best expressed its expectation that the redevelopment
occur, and at worst outright insisted on it as a condition of building its
facility.118 In July of 2005, about a month after the Supreme Court issued
its decision in Kelo, Pfizer released a statement denying that “Pfizer is
somehow involved in this matter” and insisting that the company “has no
requirements nor interest in the development of the land that is the subject
of the case.”119 But according to reporting by the New London Day,
officials at the time believed that Pfizer “would not have done the deal
110. See George Lefcoe, Jeff Benedict’s Little Pink House: The Back Story of the Kelo Case,
42 CONN. L. REV. 925, 934 (2010) (book review) (“[N]one of the condemnations were for Pfizer’s
direct use.”).
111. Id. at 931–32 (quoting JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE 15 (2009)).
112. The State of Connecticut also agreed to pay to clean up the Pfizer property, which “had
piles of rubble atop land contaminated with all sorts of industrial pollutants.” Id. at 933–34.
113. Gosselin, supra note 4.
114. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475–77 (2005).
115. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
116. Id. at 480–84.
117. See, e.g., id. at 492 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The trial court concluded . . . that
benefiting Pfizer was not ‘the primary motivation or effect of this development plan’ . . . . Even
the dissenting justices on the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed . . . .”).
118. Mann, supra note 104. Justice Thomas observed in his Kelo dissent that the New
London redevelopment plan was “suspiciously agreeable to the Pfizer Corporation.” Kelo, 545
U.S. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. Mann, supra note 104.
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without the commitment to make the surrounding area more livable.”120
A 1997 “vision statement” prepared by Pfizer’s design firm and presented
to officials “suggested various ways the existing neighborhood and
nearby vacant Navy facility could be replaced with a ‘high end residential
district,’ offices and retail businesses, expanded parking and a
marina”121—all of which made it into New London’s plans.122 ThenGovernor John Rowland reportedly said as early as 1998, “[Pfizer]
wanted a good quality of life. . . . So they wanted to know what was going
to happen to the surrounding property. It was an easy sell once they saw
what was going to happen.”123
At bottom, though, whether Pfizer demanded or merely hoped to see
these changes is not exactly material. The city took the steps it took
because it perceived that they would be necessary to capture and secure
Pfizer’s investment, jobs, and tax revenue, and to attract the virtuous
circle of development that would follow.124 Yet again, the city spent
millions of dollars of taxpayer money and condemned numerous parcels
of private property in service of a developer’s “vision” and in the largely
unsecured hope that its benefits—in terms of investment, jobs, and tax
base—would come to fruition.
And, yet again, those benefits never came, at least not durably.125
Pfizer did build its facility on its own land, and it did employ people—
lots of them, in fact—which also meant that “suppliers in Connecticut got
more work; construction workers and, later, researchers were hired—
leading to houses being purchased and money being spent at restaurants
and stores.”126 But as soon as the ten-year property tax abatement expired,
Pfizer announced it would abandon New London as part of a larger
corporate restructuring and would relocate 1,400 jobs to nearby
Groton.127 Legislators were disappointed, pointing out that the state and
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474 (describing plans).
123. David Collins, Pfizer is to Blame for Destroying the Fort Trumbull Neighborhood, THE
DAY (June 24, 2015, 7:05 AM), https://www.theday.com/article/20150623/nws05/150629736
[https://perma.cc/7RMN-5SVY]; see Tom Condon, Kelo Case a Planning Failure, HARTFORD
COURANT (Feb. 1, 2009), https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-xpm-2009-02-01plccondon-art-story.html [https://perma.cc/2KCH-3WZR] (“Pfizer, not unreasonably, wanted the
area around its new facility improved.”).
124. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473.
125. See Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer to Leave City That Won Land-Use Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 12, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/nyregion/13pfizer.html [https://perma.cc/
K4SR-3YJY].
126. Gosselin, supra note 4.
127. See McGeehan, supra note 125 (“That arrangement is scheduled to end in 2011, around
the time Pfizer, which is currently the city’s biggest taxpayer, expects to complete its
withdrawal.”).
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city had invested and “made those commitments for the long term,” not
just for a temporary boost.128
But the far worse result has been that little to none of the surrounding
Fort Trumbull property has been developed.129 Professor Ilya Somin, one
of the leading experts on the Kelo saga and its aftermath,130 reports that
even as of June 2020, “the condemned property—on which fifteen homes
once stood—remains empty, used only by feral cats” and that, “[d]espite
a variety of proposals since then, the City of New London still has not
been able to find a productive use for the land.”131 So, for all of its trouble,
all of its expense, and all of its forgone property tax revenue, the people
of New London and Connecticut achieved an expanse of newly vacant (if
less toxic) land and a building132—one that they subsequently spent
another $15 million to entice a defense contractor to occupy.133
***
These five stories of development failure are just that: five stories.
They do not demonstrate that all such projects are destined to fail, that
developers always take advantage of municipalities, or that
municipalities always strike bad deals—though one could certainly tell
other such stories.134 Indeed, “[m]ost” of these efforts “appear to cost
128. Gosselin, supra note 4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Democratic Senator
Eileen Daily).
129. See Michael A. Valenza, From the Editor-in-Chief, 47 REAL EST. L.J. 137, 138 (2018)
(“[T]he planned additional commercial development did not materialize. The land previously
occupied by Susette Kelo’s ‘little pink house’ and by the other homes and businesses remained
vacant.”); William Fulton, Eminent Domain Outrage in Connecticut, GOVERNING (Jan. 2010),
https://www.governing.com/columns/transportation-and-infrastructure/Eminent-Domain-Outrage
-in.html [https://perma.cc/W5EL-D7XM] (describing “the mostly vacant Fort Trumbull
neighborhood nearby, which was never redeveloped as the city had hoped”); Lee Howard, Pfizer
Pulls Up Stakes in NL, THE DAY (Nov. 10, 2009, 5:31 PM), https://www.theday.com/
article/20091110/NWS01/311109920 [https://perma.cc/TZW3-SFM7] (“The loss of Pfizer as a
keystone business in New London could put in further jeopardy the Fort Trumbull development
that started in conjunction with Pfizer’s move into the city but has left little but flattened buildings
and eminent-domain angst in its wake.”).
130. See generally ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON & THE
LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2015) (arguing that the Court’s decision in Kelo was in error and
evaluating options for reform).
131. Ilya Somin, The 15th Anniversary of Kelo v. City of New London, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 23, 2020), https://reason.com/2020/06/23/the-15th-anniversary-of-kelo-vcity-of-new-london/ [https://perma.cc/TXN9-4JFU].
132. See McGeehan, supra note 125 (quoting city councilman Robert M. Pero saying,
“[b]asically, our economy lost a thousand jobs, but we still have a building.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
133. Gosselin, supra note 4.
134. See, e.g., Keona Gardner, Cleveland Clinic, FIU, Christ Fellowship Help Port St. Lucie
Make Good on Failed Economic Projects, COURIER POST (May 29, 2019), https://www.courier
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cities money without changing the actual locational choices” of the
capital being wooed.135 And because there is “little evidence” to suggest
that the incentives so frequently offered by municipalities are effective at
attracting development or capturing its long-term promises, economists
“have been fairly skeptical” about their use, finding that “the costs of
attracting new industry or business through tax incentives are often not
offset by local economic benefits.”136
More to the point, though, these stories illustrate that the risk of such
failures and shortfalls is primarily borne by cities and their taxpayers, not
by the developers themselves. So, while it is not as if developers bear no
risk, the terms of the arrangements frequently entail the shifting of both
up-front costs (like land acquisition) and long-term carrying costs (like
real estate and other taxes) onto the shoulders of taxpayers, with little
guarantee that the investment will pay off.137 Taxpayers also incur
significant opportunity costs when land remains locked up for years while
developers string cities along with promises of financing or job creation
that never materialize. Finally, adding insult to injury, it is often the
taxpayers who, compared to the developers, are least well-situated to bear
these risks. This is true in equitable terms, particularly in the sorts of
economically distressed communities that are attractive targets for
redevelopment projects, and in practical terms, given that it is developers
who often have the most control over levers—like investment and
financing, hiring, attraction of corporate partners, and more—that will
generate both short- and long-term success.
In short, though not every redevelopment project will end in tears, the
reality is that all of them might and many do—to potentially catastrophic
effect for municipalities and taxpayers, especially those already in
economic distress. More focused attention to risk allocation and to its
incentive effects is therefore necessary, both for the practice of economic
redevelopment itself and in order for the associated scholarship to better

postonline.com/story/news/local/shaping-our-future/property-values/2019/05/29/cleveland-clinicport-st-lucie-ex-vgti-property/1269369001/ [https://perma.cc/YC2W-KA7Q] (discussing $220
million in losses over ten years of similarly failed development projects). Stadium construction
deals are likewise frequently bad investments for municipalities. See, e.g., Rick Paulas, Sports
Stadiums Are a Bad Deal for Cities, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com
/technology/archive/2018/11/sports-stadiums-can-be-bad-cities/576334/ [https://perma.cc/P77SPXHT] (describing professional sports teams as “bad business deals”); Andrew Zimbalist &
Roger G. Noll, Sports, Jobs, & Taxes: Are New Stadiums Worth the Cost?, BROOKINGS (June 1,
1997), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/sports-jobs-taxes-are-new-stadiums-worth-the-cost/
[https://perma.cc/E8GT-WH5B].
135. RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 126
(2016).
136. Id. at 126–27 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Lee, supra note 27, at 436–37.
137. For more on why municipalities strike these sorts of deals, see infra Section III.A.
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understand and evaluate the forces at play. The balance of this Article
answers that call.
II. PUTTING DEVELOPERS ON THE HOOK
In light of the record set out above, it may be tempting to reject the
very idea of government-financed, government-aided, or governmentdriven private development projects.138 But abandoning these projects
and the paths out of very real economic distress that they represent would
be a mistake if they could be done better—both by improving their
chances of success and by more equitably allocating the risk of failure.
This Part draws on and contributes to scholarship in takings, land use,
and municipal finance by detailing the risk-reallocation potential—and
not simply the resource-reallocation potential—of each of these areas of
law. Part III, explores the political economy—at the state, local, and
regional levels—of implementing the sorts of measures that emerge from
this analysis. In so doing, it also engages further with objections to
shifting more risk to developers.
A. Land Acquisition Costs
One of the most common features of development failures is a locality
that spends millions or even hundreds of millions of dollars on land
acquisition for a private developer that, in turn, is not obligated to even
come close to reimbursing the locality for those expenditures. That
should change, not simply in order to redistribute resources from
developers to taxpayers, but as a means of reallocating risk from
taxpayers to developers.
Localities acquire land for development in two ways. The first is no
different from how any other entity would acquire such land: a
consensual sale in which a willing property owner agrees to sell their
property for an agreed-upon price. This setting will be discussed in a
moment. The second, unique to government, is by exercising the power
of eminent domain: a forced sale from an unwilling property owner to the
government in exchange for “just compensation”—generally defined, not
by a negotiated price, but simply as the fair market value of the property

138. The problems that animate this Article, and the measures discussed below, have to do
with private projects that directly generate private benefits and only indirectly promise to generate
public benefits. Purely public projects like parks, public housing, or train stations raise far fewer
risk-allocation concerns because the government has comparatively more control over outcomes
and because the public benefits are direct. That is, while there is still risk that purely public
projects do not ultimately benefit their communities, government and taxpayers rightly bear that
risk because they also stand to gain nearly all of the upside. The focus in this Article is therefore
on the projects where private developers stand to gain most of the direct upside while the public,
whose upside is indirect at best, currently bears most of the risk.
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being acquired.139 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, along with similar provisions of the states’
constitutions, imposes only one additional limit on this power to “take”
or condemn private property: the taking must be for a “public use.”140
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court held in Kelo that a “public
use” is established within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment as long
as the legislature reasonably believes it is pursuing a redevelopment plan
that will contribute to economic revitalization and growth.141 The
Michigan Supreme Court had done essentially the same under its state
constitution in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit.142 The
key import of holdings like these is that governments are empowered to
condemn property even if the acquired property will be owned and used
by a different private owner rather than by the government or general
public.143
One reading of Kelo is that it changed very little about eminent
domain law—that its holding was essentially always true, as the prior
existence of decisions like Poletown suggests. And indeed, as the Court
explained in Kelo, it had previously concluded in Berman v. Parker144
that condemnation of a “blighted” area for purposes of (private)
redevelopment was consistent with the Takings Clause notwithstanding
the absence of public ownership or use by the public.145 The Court
reached the same conclusion, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,146
with respect to taking title to property from lessors and distributing it to
(private) lessees for the purpose of reducing the concentration of
ownership.147
But cases like Berman and Midkiff involved an at least plausibly
distinct factual premise: the pre-condemnation land use was actively
harmful to the public interest.148 The development context, by contrast,
does not involve pre-condemnation land uses that are actively harmful
139. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984)
(stating that compensation owed is “to be measured by ‘the market value of the property at the
time of the taking’” (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934))); 29A C.J.S.
Eminent Domain §§ 135–36 (2021) (collecting citations across states).
140. U.S. CONST. amend. V; e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; N.Y.
CONST. art I, § 7(a); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17; see also FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6 (“public purpose”).
141. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483–84 (2005).
142. 304 N.W.2d 455, 457, 459 (Mich. 1981) (per curiam), overruled by County of Wayne
v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
143. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483–87.
144. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
145. Id. at 35–36.
146. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
147. Id. at 231–32.
148. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 32–33; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232; Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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but rather land uses that are merely not as beneficial to the local economy
as they were held out to be.
This is not the place to relitigate Kelo. But whether Kelo and its state
court counterparts took or simply confirmed a step beyond takings of the
blight-removal sort, these decisions had an important and
underappreciated effect. The narrower the universe of permissible
“public uses,” and the closer they are to government ownership or actual
land use by the public (like a road or a park), the better the match between
condemnor, beneficiary, and payor. Take the simplest version where, say,
the government condemns a few houses in order to demolish them and
installs a public highway. The government as the representative of the
public is the condemnor, the public is the beneficiary, and the government
as trustee of the public fisc is the payor. With one important complication
explored below,149 this is a fairly closed loop: the public acts, the public
benefits, and the public pays.
The larger the universe of permissible “public uses” and the more
distant or theoretical the public benefits, however, the looser the loop
becomes: the public acts, the public pays, but a private interest directly
benefits. Of course, the Supreme Court has emphasized that a locality
“would no doubt be forbidden from taking . . . land for the purpose of
conferring a private benefit on a particular private party,”150 but short of
that far end of the spectrum, the argument for permitting development
takings is based on the promise that the public benefits indirectly too. But
the more speculative that promise, the greater the disconnect between
beneficiary and payor. And indeed, the more the developer is in the
driver’s seat in terms of selecting the site, conceiving the project, and
creating the plan, the more the government is the condemnor in name
only, acting at the behest of the developer. In these settings, it is the
developer who drives the action and directly benefits, while the public
pays and only hopes to enjoy trickle-down benefits.
The consequences of this mismatch have the potential to be quite
striking. After all, the purpose of the compensation requirement is
ostensibly to deter the government and push it to exercise the power of
eminent domain only when doing so is efficient. If the government did
not have to compensate property owners at all, the story goes, it would
make takings decisions only by examining its own benefits and without
regard to the costs imposed on the dispossessed property owners or
society at large.151 In other words, the government “would not feel
149. See infra notes 188–97 and accompanying text.
150. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
151. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56–57 (9th ed. 2014);
Heller & Krier, supra note 23, at 1001; Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard:
Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 882–83 (1995); Robert C.
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incentives, created by the price system, to use those resources
efficiently.”152 By forcing a condemning government to compensate
owners, a compensation requirement addresses the “fiscal illusion” under
which governments operate and makes those governments internalize the
costs they impose, not just the benefits they enjoy.153 But if the developer
is driving the condemnation, and if the developer is the direct or most
guaranteed beneficiary, then compensation requirements as currently
understood and imposed on municipal governments mean that
governments internalize only the costs and externalize many of the
benefits.
The other side of the coin, of course, is that developers are left to
operate like a government freed from the compensation requirement—to
internalize only benefits, externalize costs, and make takings decisions
without regard to the risks they impose on the public. The predicted result
would be numerous inefficient condemnations that fail to seriously weigh
costs and benefits. And that is exactly what has happened. Indeed, on this
account, the failures recounted in Part I ought hardly to have been a
surprise.
Solving this mismatch would be an important step towards
reallocating the risk of these sorts of development failures. The mismatch
could be solved in one of two ways. The first would be to limit the scope
of the “public use,” which would close the beneficiary-payor loop on the
beneficiary side by ensuring that the public internalizes all of the benefits
of any taking. And some states have made some gestures toward
restricting what sorts of purposes might qualify as “public uses.”154 Some
scholars have questioned just how effective these restrictions have
been.155 But even if they were effective, this approach would come at the
cost of potentially preventing even socially beneficial redevelopment
projects.156 Without the power of eminent domain in these settings,
individuals whose property is crucial to the assembly of necessary parcels
would be able to hold out for extraordinary sums of money that either

Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 420
(1977).
152. Heller & Krier, supra note 23, at 999.
153. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 621–22 (1984).
154. See Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years after Kelo, 125 YALE L.J. F. 82, 84–88
(2015).
155. See generally Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to
Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009) (discussing the legislative response to Kelo and its
shortcomings).
156. See, e.g., Lehavi & Licht, supra note 12, at 1706 (“[A] flat prohibition on the use of
eminent domain to assemble land from numerous owners to allow large-scale, financially
profitable projects is highly problematic on the policy level.”).
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shut down projects or result in inefficient and unjust wealth transfers from
the public to the holdouts.157
For this reason, the superior way of addressing the mismatch is to
close the beneficiary-payor loop on the payor side—ensuring that
developers internalize the costs of any taking by requiring them, rather
than governments, to pay the compensation out of their own pockets.
Moreover, unlike efforts to pare back Kelo, this solution on the payor side
also addresses the fact that the same mismatch occurs when the
government consensually purchases property for development purposes.
Recall that we initially bracketed the consensual sale setting, but there,
too, developers who do not have to pay the negotiated purchase price do
not internalize those costs. Indeed, though the Kelo decision neatly
illustrates the problem, it does not describe its full scope. The problem
extends to all land acquisition costs, not just those associated with the
exercise of eminent domain.
Consider the track record. In Poletown, the government paid $300
million for the land that GM needed for its plant; GM kicked in $8
million.158 In Mesa, the city spent $7 million for the necessary property;
the developer paid nothing but a couple thousand dollars in penalty
payments when it was unable to secure financing.159 In New York City,
the government spent many tens of millions of dollars on land
acquisitions and condemnations; the NYSE spent about $10 million.160
And these are not just cherry-picked anecdotes. As Yun-Chien Chang has
described, “Often the government first condemns the properties,
compensates the condemnees, and then resells the properties to the
developers,” but “there is no necessary connection between the amount
of takings compensation that the government pays and what the
government charges to developers.”161 So there are “many examples” of
governments selling condemned properties at massive discounts.162 The
result is that municipalities routinely “insulate” developers “from
condemnation’s social costs.”163
The consequence of this insulation—whether from the costs of
consensual purchases or condemnations—is, as explained above, that
developer behavior takes no account or too little account of the risk of
157. See, e.g., Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1465, 1473 (2008); Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV.
957, 971–72 (2004); Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One
More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 572 (1993).
158. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 70, 76 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
161. Yun-Chien Chang, Economic Value or Fair Market Value: What Form of Takings
Compensation is Efficient?, 20 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 35, 60 (2012).
162. Id.
163. Id.; see Bell, supra note 23, at 568; Lehavi & Licht, supra note 12, at 1722.
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failure and the costs that failure would impose. Developers are invited to
free-ride on the government and the taxpayers. For their part, they pay
pennies on the dollar for the property they plan to build on, so when those
projects go south, their losses are limited to their relatively small up-front
costs. Governments and taxpayers, by contrast, experience that failure as
the loss of their much more substantial up-front costs.
Requiring developers to instead pay dollar-for-dollar the
compensation owed to condemnees and the price owed to consensual
sellers would have three primary salutary effects. First, it would lead the
developer to internalize both costs and benefits and, accordingly, to make
more efficient and prudent development and takings decisions. Simply
put, it would help ensure that the projects developers pursue are not more
outlandish than they themselves would be willing to risk. The result might
well be fewer projects pursued, but a higher proportion of those projects
ought to bear fruit. Just as important, if not more, the developer’s
payment of compensation up front would represent an investment they
make in the long-term success of the project. With cities and taxpayers
bearing these costs, developers currently have little to no skin in the
game, so they have little incentive not to throw in the towel as soon as
things get dicey. But if they had to put their money where their mouths
are in the form of full payment for the property in question, developers
would have a greater incentive to do what it takes in the days and months
and years after the property acquisition itself to see that investment
succeed.
Second, on those occasions when projects do fail or fail to meet
expectations, the costs will rest with the party in the best position to have
prevented or at least mitigated that failure. After all, while even the best
laid plans can falter, the worst laid ones falter more frequently. And it is
often the developers themselves—as the stories in Part I put into bold
relief—who have the most control over the circumstances that will
generate communitywide benefits: making smart site selection choices up
front, securing financing, and maintaining a stream of financial support,
hiring local contractors and employees to stimulate the local economy,
and so on.
Third, if a project does fail, the costs will likely rest with the party in
the best position to absorb the consequences. With some obvious
exceptions like the New York City story discussed above, many of these
projects are pursued in distressed communities like New London and
Detroit precisely because they are the communities most in need of
development, job creation, and a larger tax base. It is therefore especially
perverse that the risks of failure are piled onto the shoulders of cities and
taxpayers already in dire economic straits and at the end of their rope in
terms of their ability to squeeze any more revenue out of the stone of a
shrunken tax base. Developers, by contrast, have the luxury of choosing
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how far to leverage themselves. They can diversify their portfolios with
different sorts of projects in different locations, whereas municipalities
are stuck with the territory they have and taxpayers tend to be all-in
financially on their homes and face unrealistic exit options. 164 And
developers generally have greater resources, greater flexibility, and
greater access to credit than municipalities given that municipalities
throughout the country are chronically underfunded and strictly limited
by state law in terms of their ability to run deficits or borrow money.165
Take deficits first. In contrast to the federal government and private
firms, “nearly all state (and local) governments are required to balance
their budgets annually”—required by law, that is, not simply by
prudence.166 And while these requirements vary in terms of the degree to
which they constrain,167 the point is simply that they impose yet another
limitation on local financial flexibility.
Now consider debt. In nearly every state, municipalities face caps on
the amount of debt they may assume—often a percentage of the assessed
value of taxable property, which, again, is likely to be low in precisely
those communities in need of redevelopment—as well as special
referendum procedures for issuing debt which are geared, “not towards
optimizing debt levels,” but “simply limiting debt levels.”168 To be sure,
localities have identified some creative ways to partially evade these
limits,169 and state courts have struggled to differentiate between debts
that are subject to these limits and debts that are not.170 But while
municipalities certainly can and do issue some bonds and assume some
164. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 7, at 1059 (“Homebuyers . . . make an investment. This
investment is typically the single largest one in the household’s portfolio, and it is often heavily
leveraged.” (footnotes omitted)); Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 626 (2002)
(reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001)) (“[H]omeowners are
often in no position to comparison shop; moving is relatively costly and may be extraordinarily
painful if it means realizing a loss.”).
165. See Selmi, supra note 6, at 619 (“[L]ocal governments in the twenty-first century have
very limited financial resources.”).
166. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2592 (2005);
see Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 866 (“Forty-one state
constitutions include balanced budget requirements.”).
167. See Robert Ward Shaw, Comment, The States, Balanced Budgets, and Fundamental
Shifts in Federalism, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1195, 1226–28 (2004).
168. Shoked, supra note 6, at 1253; see Sterk & Goldman, supra note 6, at 1315–16
(discussing forms of debt limitations). That is, even though there is an “extensive and robust
market for local bonds,” localities’ “capacity to act on their inclination to borrow is still limited—
by law.” Shoked, supra note 6, at 1251.
169. See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 925–26 (2011); Sterk & Goldman, supra note 6, at 1302
(agreeing but arguing that even weakened constraints “protect against the worst sorts of legislative
abuse”).
170. See Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local
Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 983 (1988).
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debt, it remains the case that these limits “sometimes block localities from
accessing requisite credit,” “force governments to pay higher interest
rates, generate administrative expenses, give birth to deals suboptimally
structured from a public finance perspective,” and more.171
Most takings scholars overlook both the problem of developer freeriding and the solution of developer payment. Instead, they tend to focus
on finding the right measure of takings compensation, in large part
because of their focus on the distribution of resources rather than the
distribution of risk.172 But while there might well be reasons to address
the widely recognized problem of undercompensation,173 focusing on
valuation overlooks the deeper problem that the wrong entity is paying
that compensation and that there is, accordingly, a misallocation of risk.
It also overlooks the problems in government-paid consensual purchases.
An important exception on the takings front is the work of Professors
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky. Bell and Parchomovsky
identify and describe “givings” as occurring when a government grants a
private actor a property interest or, in some circumstances, enhances
private property value by means of regulation.174 Among other things,
they argue that just as governments compensate for takings, they should
“assess charges for givings” and impose those charges on the
beneficiaries.175 But while their prescription is similar, their argument—
like so much of the takings literature—focuses on “efficiency principles”
and “the demands of corrective justice” in terms of resources, and with a
focus on addressing distortions in government incentives in takings and

171. Shoked, supra note 6, at 1255 (footnotes omitted). Indeed, the greater the risk of a
development project failing and threatening municipal revenue, the more powerful is the argument
that the municipality’s financing attempts really do involve issuing “debt” within the meaning of
these legal limits. See LYNN A. BAKER, CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & DAVID SCHLEICHER, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 634 (5th ed. 2015).
172. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 161, at 39–40 (arguing for an ex post assessment method);
Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 239, 242
n.10, 256–61 (2007) (discussing multiple compensation reform proposals); Heller & Hills, supra
note 157, at 1473 (discussing holdout problems); Fennell, supra note 157, at 979, 982 (discussing
different mechanistic tests). See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking
Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871 (2007) (offering a self-assessment mechanism).
173. See, e.g., Heller & Hills, supra note 157, at 1475; Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note
172, at 873; James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 866;
Fennell, supra note 157, at 962–67. But see generally Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected
Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2006) (arguing that scholars
overstate the undercompensation problem and overlook ways outside of the constitutional process
in which governments make owners whole).
174. Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 23, at 563.
175. Id. at 577–78; see id. at 597 (“[W]hen compensable takings are associated with
chargeable givings, the recipients of the giving should compensate the victims of the taking.”).
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givings.176 The foregoing has shown, by contrast, that an equally if not
more salient justification is securing on-the-ground commitment, buy-in,
and long-term success—in light of a pattern of failure that Bell and
Parchomovsky do not examine—by addressing risk-based distortions in
developer incentives in both the initial acquisition and the long-run
course of the project.177
One other proposal deserves mention. In a later publication, Bell goes
many steps further and suggests that developers should be delegated the
power of eminent domain directly and altogether.178 Bell notes some
precedent for this practice in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
delegations to utility and railroad companies,179 and he argues that this
practice “should be preferred” because the government’s role in takings
is “frequently counterproductive and inefficient” and because “there are
times when the discipline of markets is more effective than the discipline
of politics.”180
This intriguing piece has much to offer, and its thrust resonates with
the argument advanced here. But Bell’s recommendation is suboptimal
for a few reasons. First, in line with the practice he identifies, Bell focuses
first on utility companies or similar potential takers whose need for
repeated takings over time may make it “unnecessarily burdensome to
require external ratification of each exercise of the takings power.”181 In
these settings, this is not an unreasonable position. Similarly, the federal
government has delegated its eminent domain authority to certain private
industries like those constructing bridges or qualifying natural gas
pipelines.182 This sort of delegation is likewise justifiable by the sheer,
often interjurisdictional scope of such an undertaking and the
176. Id. at 600; see id. at 578–89 (analyzing through lenses of fairness and efficiency). The
same is true of their later, narrower brush with development takings and developer payment
obligations in the context of their “conservation commons” proposal. See Bell & Parchomovsky,
Of Property, supra note 23, at 53–56.
177. Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 23, at 557 (“invit[ing]—and
acknowledg[ing] the need for—future development and refinement” of their givings framework).
To be sure, the literature also considers incentives for would-be condemnees, see, e.g., Levinson,
supra note 23, at 388–93, but it tends to overlook the incentives for condemnation’s nongovernment beneficiaries. Further, insofar as Bell & Parchomovsky aim to insure against failure,
focusing on the payment of compensation on the front end can only go so far. More is needed,
particularly to prevent other features of development programs like tax abatements from wiping
out the beneficial effect of developer-paid compensation. See infra Section II.C.
178. Bell, supra note 23, at 521.
179. See id. at 545–48.
180. Id. at 521.
181. Id. at 562.
182. See Penneast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 141 S. Ct. 2244, 2255–56 (2021) (discussing
practice); Act of July 25, 1947, ch. 333, 61 Stat. 459 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h)).
Some states have likewise delegated the power of eminent domain to “common carrier” pipelines.
See, e.g., TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 111.019.
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consequential magnification of holdout power. But development takings
like those discussed here are a far cry from either of these cases, and there
seems little argument in the development context that government
retention of the takings power is unduly burdensome for either
government or developer.
Bell nonetheless makes the case for private eminent domain in the
broader context of land assembly for development,183 and he does so by
once again focusing generally on values of distributive justice and
planning efficiency.184 But in so doing he overlooks the important values
that drive this Article: allocation, not just of resources, but of risk. Even
a project that appears—based on assumptions in place at the time—that
it will strike a just and efficient distribution of resources may turn out not
to do so if the relevant assumptions about, say, budget projections or job
creation fail to pan out. A regime built around efficient and just resourceallocation with insufficient attention to efficient and just risk-allocation
may therefore create more problems than it ultimately solves.
Specifically, while Bell is certainly right that politics provides only
imperfect accountability,185 so do markets.186 Trading one for the other
might be worth doing to get financial commitment from the developer,
but fortunately, we need not choose between the two. Whereas Bell’s
approach largely gives up on political accountability,187 the path outlined
here splits the eminent domain atom—government power and developer
payment—and thus keeps both government and developer on the hook
for the consequences. Imperfect though each may be, this belt-andsuspenders approach to accountability stands a better chance of securing
commitment and imposing consequences—that is, of achieving efficient
and just allocations of risk—than either one does alone.
Finally, the developer-pays proposal articulated here—which
addresses problems Bell and Parchomovsky do not and avoids pitfalls
that Bell risks—is only slightly complicated by a reservation flagged
above.188 Earlier, we supposed that the government’s role in a truly public
taking—for a park or a road, for example—was represented by that closed
loop of benefit and cost and that the government was disciplined by the
compensation requirement to act efficiently.189 But as Professor Daryl
Levinson has famously argued, that is a serious oversimplification
183. Bell, supra note 23, at 567–71.
184. See id. at 528, 567–71.
185. See id. at 575.
186. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1260–70 (2003) (discussing dynamics and imperfections of
both political and market accountability).
187. See Bell, supra note 23, at 544 (“[T]he reliance on public decisionmaking by a state
apparatus, rather than the discipline of the market, seems unlikely to reach efficient results.”).
188. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
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because government does not internalize costs in the way the theory
assumes—that is, in the way that private firms do.190 According to
Levinson, government does not consider financial outflows or inflows in
terms of money but only in terms of political costs and benefits. 191 And
while those political incentives may be “causally connected to social
costs and benefits, . . . they are not the same thing.”192 More problematic
still, Levinson demonstrated that that causal connection is itself
indeterminate.193 There is therefore some reason to question the standard
account of the way in which compensation requirements discipline
government in the eminent domain setting.
Assuming Levinson is correct, though, his account only further
supports the argument that the developer needs to pay. 194 First and most
importantly, if government does not adequately respond to the incentive
effects created by the compensation requirement, and if developers are
not paying in full, then nobody is properly internalizing the costs of land
acquisition. This is yet another reason that compensation ought to be paid
in appropriate circumstances by an entity that can be expected to respond
rationally to financial costs: a private firm like a real estate developer.195
In other words, insofar as pathologies of government decisionmaking
minimize the efficacy of a compensation obligation, shifting that
obligation to an entity that will better respond to it is not only warranted
for the reasons outlined above, but also because it will lead to more
efficient development decisionmaking.
Second, if Levinson is right that governments only respond to political
costs, there is good reason to think that dynamic is especially distorting
in the development context. While the actual financial outlays come in
the short term, the realization that those costs are not going to be repaid
in the form of a successful development project will often not occur for
years.196 This means that a local legislator or mayor can escape the
190. Levinson, supra note 23, at 359.
191. Id. at 361 (“[T]he accountability argument starts from the understanding that elected
officials make decisions based solely on political costs and benefits.”); see id. at 420
(“[G]overnment cares not about dollars, only about votes.”).
192. Id. at 357.
193. Id.
194. I have elsewhere expressed reservations about some aspects of Levinson’s account as
applied to bureaucrats rather than elected officials. See Michael C. Pollack, Taking Data, 86 U.
CHI. L. REV. 77, 122–31 (2019).
195. See Levinson, supra note 23, at 346 (“No one doubts, for example, that a profitmaximizing firm will tend to ignore social costs that are not reflected in financial outflows, or that
it will take account of costs that are reflected in financial flows and perhaps change its behavior
in response.” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 355 (noting that investor control and selection “justify—
within reasonable limits—modeling firms operating in economic markets as profit-maximizers”).
196. Even if this temporal problem were not present, there is some reason to suspect that the
government also tends to overestimate benefits and underestimate costs. See Michael H. Schill,

2021]

REALLOCATING REDEVELOPMENT RISK

1113

political reckoning that comes from failure: today’s legislature can
effectively externalize the political costs of failure onto tomorrow’s
legislature while internalizing the political benefits that come from grand
promises of jobs and prosperity.197 As a result, even political costs will
not adequately discipline governments here. Levinson’s work thus
provides yet another reason to shift payment obligations to developers in
the interest of shifting risk and thereby incentivizing rational, efficient
development decisionmaking on the front end, and commitments to
durable success and community benefits on the back end.
B. The Land Use Toolkit
Getting a project off the ground is significant, but it is only part of the
battle. As stories like Poletown and New London illustrate, municipalities
and taxpayers also take on the risk that even a completed project will not
generate the benefits that developers promise and that local officials hope
for. To reallocate that type of development risk, we need other tools
beyond the payment of land acquisition costs.
We can adapt some from the context of land use regulation. To begin
with the most fundamental, zoning is how communities allocate the siting
of permissible land uses.198 Acting pursuant to delegations of authority
from the states, local legislatures enact zoning ordinances that carve
localities into zones and that declare which land uses and which shapes
and sizes of buildings are permitted where—either as of right or under
designated circumstances—or not at all.199 While property owners are
permitted to seek variances from local administrative agencies like a
board of adjustment or board of zoning appeals, variances are only
authorized under relatively narrow circumstances.200 Sometimes owners
or prospective owners and developers therefore want or need a parcel to
be rezoned entirely, which means convincing the local legislature to

Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
829, 859 n.116 (1989) (collecting studies).
197. To be sure, today’s legislature cannot externalize onto tomorrow’s the immediate
political costs of the condemnation itself, but because the condemnees are often a numerical
minority in a larger constituency that theoretically stands to benefit—and because developers
themselves have power and can be significant campaign contributors—those political costs are
likely to be comparatively small. Cf. Levinson, supra note 23, at 376 (observing the possibility
that “government will over-take because social benefits are politically inflated and social costs
politically discounted”).
198. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–90 (1926).
199. See Selmi, supra note 6, at 600.
200. E.g., Commons v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 A.2d 1138, 1141–43 (N.J.
1980).
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amend the zoning ordinance.201 Local legislatures therefore have some
leverage to make demands of developers.202
One way to exploit that leverage—again, not to extract resources but
to better allocate risk—is through development agreements. A
development agreement is a legally binding contract between a property
owner and a local legislature.203 As they are currently practiced, the
government rezones a parcel for a property owner’s benefit and “freezes”
those land use regulations in place during the limited course of the
project; in exchange, the property owner provides “funding, land, and
other support for schools, parks, community facilities, or affordable
housing projects.”204 Development agreements have become “an
increasingly popular approach to land use decisionmaking” because they
provide developers with certainty and give municipalities the opportunity
to have a voice in the project and to advance their own planning goals.205
To be lawful, or at least to mitigate doubts about their lawfulness,
development agreements must satisfy three conditions. First, they
generally must be authorized by state law.206 Second, they must be
carefully crafted so they do not “contract away,” for the benefit of a
particular developer, the government’s police power to regulate in the
public interest.207 Third, and related, today’s legislature must not exercise
(or commit not to exercise) the powers of tomorrow’s legislature. 208 All
of that said, however, courts have tended to uphold state-authorized
development agreements so long as they reserve some governmental
control and are limited in duration with a “fixed termination date”
somewhere less than “decades away.”209 Once these hurdles are cleared,
development agreements can be an effective tool of land use planning.
201. See Selmi, supra note 6, at 600.
202. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Unjust Cities? Gentrification, Integration, and the Fair
Housing Act, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 835, 865 (2019) (“[M]uch of private development depends on
public levers and largesse—be it tax credits or land rezoning. Accountable development would
ask for a public benefit in exchange.”).
203. Nachman, supra note 18, at 80.
204. Id. at 79; see Selmi, supra note 6, at 597.
205. Nachman, supra note 18, at 80.
206. See David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development
Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities After
Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001) (“[A] bilateral agreement,
particularly one sanctioned by the state through enabling legislation reciting the public purpose
behind such agreement, is by far a more legally sound way to proceed.”); Nachman, supra note
18, at 82; cf. infra Section III.B (discussing role of state legislation).
207. Selmi, supra note 6, at 594; see Callies & Tappendorf, supra note 206, at 672.
208. See Selmi, supra note 6, at 616 (emphasizing “the concept that government cannot,
through an agreement with a developer, tie its hands from acting in the future”).
209. Callies & Tappendorf, supra note 206, at 676; see Nachman, supra note 18, at 96;
Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-For Zoning That Is Neither Illegal
Contract Nor Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 409, 489–95 (2004).
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And while they vary in terms of their authorized scope and process,210
they are not paper tigers: courts “have been strict in forcing the parties to
live up to their bargains” and have even ordered property owners to make
promised, bargained-for infrastructure improvements.211
In the sorts of redevelopment projects at issue here, land might well
need to be rezoned and municipalities might make use of—and in many
cases likely are making use of—development agreements in that land use
planning process. And indeed, some of the common terms are capable of
spreading some of the risk, particularly when it comes to the opportunity
costs borne by taxpayers. As discussed with respect to a few of the case
studies in Part I, these opportunity costs represent some of the biggest
costs of potential failure: forgone tax revenue and public dollars spent on
land acquisition represent money that could have been spent on roads and
parks and schools, and land that is locked up for a project that never
comes to fruition is land that could have been any number of other things
that benefited taxpayers—either by generating revenue or by being a
public resource.212 Binding agreements from developers to improve
infrastructure, for example, work to some extent to defray those
opportunity costs. Accordingly, where authorized, municipalities should
continue in this vein or should start making use of this tool along these
lines. And, in states that do not yet permit municipalities to enter into
development agreements, these agreements’ potential to mitigate the risk
of failure ought to weigh in favor of authorizing them.
But municipalities—and their states’ authorizing statutes213—can also
go further, both with respect to the terms and the settings of these
agreements.214 Take the terms first, with just a few examples. Agreements
for developers to improve infrastructure are not the only way, or even
necessarily the best way, of reallocating risk. First, municipalities might
instead (or in addition) negotiate for commitments to employ a certain
210. See Nachman, supra note 18, at 81–86 (discussing variation).
211. Callies & Tappendorf, supra note 206, at 691. Daniel Selmi has argued that
development agreements represent “at least a partial abandonment of the hierarchical
relationship” between government and developer and constitute an “admission by the government
that it cannot afford to fund the public services that the public has come to expect.” Selmi, supra
note 6, at 613–15. For better or for worse, though, that admission is accurate. If anything,
governments have assumed too subordinate a role vis-à-vis developers such that use of
development agreements could restore at least parity. See JULIAN GROSS, GREG LE ROY &
MADELINE JANIS APARICIO, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE 4 (2005), https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/
cba2005final.pdf [https://perma.cc/323F-NH96] (similarly observing that “the public-private
partnerships at the local level are being driven for the most part by the private sector”).
212. See supra Part I (discussing development failures).
213. See infra Section III.B (discussing role of state legislation).
214. This Article is not suggesting any unlawful expansion of development agreements. See
supra notes 207–10 and accompanying text. The municipality would be getting more out of the
agreement, not less, and at no greater cost to its police powers.
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number of local workers in both construction and the finished project,
and to pay them a living wage. These would help to shore up promises of
collateral economic benefits to the surrounding community and mitigate
the risk of creating another Poletown fiasco.215 Second, where the
developer itself is going to be the corporate occupant of the completed
project—like GM in Poletown,216 or the NYSE in New York City217—
the development agreement might also require the developer to subsidize
the cost of local housing for any employees not hired from the existing
community. That would represent an incentive for employees to live in
town as opposed to in a neighboring community, thereby contributing to
the tax base of the same locality that authorized (and bore risk for) the
development. Third, in cases like New London, where Pfizer allegedly
demanded the city make the surrounding area fit its “vision” of an
attractive residential and business district,218 a development agreement
could obligate a partner to contribute financially to attracting new
businesses to serve a revitalized local community, along with residential
developers and other amenities. Fourth, monetary penalties could be
baked into the development agreement in the event that the developer
fails to attract tenants for its project or new business to the surrounding
area—or, as the Mesa City Council belatedly observed and as Las Vegas
seemingly never did, fails to attract financing for the project.219
In many cases, of course, developers may not need land to be rezoned.
But localities are nonetheless not without power. First and foremost, it
holds the keys to variances and other discretionary authorizations—all of
which are also potential pressure points for development agreements.
Second, the locality has one critically important piece of leverage: the
sole power to condemn the necessary land. As discussed above, land
assembly aided by the exercise of eminent domain is often critical to a
development project, and only the government can bring that tool to the
table. In other words, even if developers are made to pay the
compensation along the lines set out above, they cannot carry out the
taking on their own. Localities and states therefore should consider
expanding development agreements into what this Article calls “takings
agreements.” Recognizing that they have something that the developer
needs, localities can refuse to exercise their eminent domain power unless
the developer contractually agrees to terms that result in a fair spreading
of risk. These terms should naturally include the developer’s full payment

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 59–63, 72–78 and accompanying text.
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of the land acquisition costs, but they should also include other riskshifting terms like those just discussed.220
The potential utility of takings agreements is another reason why it
would be a mistake, contrary to Bell’s argument highlighted above, for
governments to delegate the eminent domain power altogether and
increase the universe of private takings.221 This power could translate into
a meaningful bargaining chip for local governments to which they could
attach individualized conditions tailored to the circumstances of
particular projects. Bell’s block-grant approach, by contrast, would give
away all of that potential for beneficial coercion. That is, in addition to
the critiques already offered,222 not only does splitting the atom of
eminent domain double the chances for accountability in the case of
failure, but it can stave off failure by empowering governments to check
developers and to better bind them to their promises.223 To use a different
metaphor, if both keys need to be turned to activate the eminent domain
machine, the government can refuse to turn its key until it receives
sufficient binding commitments that mitigate the risk shouldered by the
public.
A second and related land use regulation tool that can be used for riskreallocation purposes is the community benefit agreement (CBA).224 A
CBA is similar to a development agreement in that it is a binding contract,
but rather than being made by the developer and the locality, a CBA is
made by the developer and one or more community groups.225 The
general framework is that, in exchange for the community groups’
support for a new development project, the developer will agree to certain
measures and policies that benefit the community.226 Though not
generally framed as such, many common provisions fit neatly under a
risk-reallocation heading and therefore could be a valuable part of a
strategy to address the problems that animate this Article.227 For example,
220. Takings agreements, which buy the municipality assurances or concessions from the
developer, pose no greater risk of illegality than any other development agreement. In fact, they
pose even less because there is no danger that the municipality is contracting away its long-term
police power. See supra notes 207–10 and accompanying text.
221. See Bell, supra note 23, at 543–44; supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text
(discussing same).
222. See supra notes 181–87 and accompanying text.
223. One might object that local governments cannot be trusted to use this power efficiently
or effectively. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 23, at 575. Even so, it is far from clear that placing
relative faith in developers is appropriate instead. For further discussion of how states might
encourage local governments towards exercising this power effectively, see Section III.B, infra.
224. See generally Salkin & Lavine, supra note 18 (discussing community benefit
agreements in depth).
225. See, e.g., id. at 19; Selmi, supra note 6, at 642.
226. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 18, at 19.
227. Cf. id. at 20 (noting that CBAs came out of “increased public concern for developer
accountability”).
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many CBAs include commitments from the developer to pay living
wages, hire local workers, guarantee certain minimums for hiring
minority employees, provide affordable housing, and mitigate
environmental impacts.228 Some CBAs even commit developers to, for
example, “attract a grocery store operator who pays living wages and
benefits” or provide funding “for arts, youth, and culture services in the
surrounding communities.”229 Needless to say, these sorts of
commitments have the potential to go a long way towards ensuring that
completed projects generate, not only private returns for the developer,
but also the broader public benefits that developers promise.
CBAs do, however, have important limitations because they are
purely private arrangements. While they sidestep the aforementioned
doctrinal hurdles with respect to the authority to contract away the police
power,230 they risk being a less meaningful constraint on developers
because they rely on private enforcement by community groups that
might lose interest, be bought off, lack resources to litigate, or not fairly
represent the community as a whole.231 Developers also have to be
interested in negotiating with community organizations and in securing
their support in the first place.232 These obstacles all make turning CBAs
into a reliably effective tool of risk-shifting a fairly tall order. The
argument here is thus simply that CBAs can represent another pressure
point at which developers can be bound to a number of measures that
work to minimize the community’s risk that even a completed project
fails to meet expectations. Where the opportunity presents itself, then,
community organizations should continue to aggressively approach these
negotiations with an eye toward commitments that serve that goal. And
local governments should have their backs when they do so by, for
example, supporting their efforts and incorporating those CBAs into
parallel development agreements—where those are authorized—so that
the localities have the power to enforce them too.233
228. See id. at 19, 23–25.
229. Id. at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
230. See David A. Marcello, Community Benefit Agreements: New Vehicle for Investment in
America’s Neighborhoods, 39 URB. LAW. 657, 662 (2007) (“CBAs generally are contracts
between two private parties—a developer and a community coalition. Consequently, they are not
subject to the legal problems that confront public entities, such as a city, when entering into a
development agreement with the same developer.” (footnote omitted)); supra notes 207–09 and
accompanying text.
231. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 18, at 32.
232. Id. at 30–31; see Selmi, supra note 6, at 642 (contending that CBAs are “not
widespread, in part because developers have little incentive to enter into them”). But see Marcello,
supra note 230, at 659–60 (emphasizing that “[t]he public subsidies so often sought by large
developers provide a principal point of leverage for community groups in CBA negotiations”
(footnote omitted)).
233. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 18, at 20, 32.

2021]

REALLOCATING REDEVELOPMENT RISK

1119

A third land use regulation device that could be made to serve as a
risk-reallocation tool is the exaction. Whereas development agreements
and CBAs are negotiated bargains, an exaction is a tool—albeit more
limited in scope—with which local government can unilaterally
reallocate risk. In the exactions setting, local government essentially
places a condition on its granting of permission to develop: the property
owner must, in exchange, dedicate either real property or money to the
municipality. This arrangement might smack of “extortion,”234 but it
addresses a very real concern—namely, the “reality . . . that many
proposed land uses threaten to impose costs on the public that dedications
of property can offset.”235 For example, a new, more intense land use
could increase traffic congestion, so a municipality might legitimately
want the owner, in exchange for approval of the project, to relinquish land
necessary to widen the adjacent road.236 Because “[i]nsisting that
landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a
hallmark of responsible land-use policy,” the Court has “long sustained
such regulations against constitutional attack.”237 Localities are limited,
however, to make only those demands—again, in the form of real
property or money—that bear an “essential nexus” to the social costs
imposed by the development and that are in “rough proportionality” to
the extent of those costs.238
These doctrinal hurdles naturally limit localities’ power to extract
money or property from developers.239 They also exert an “in terrorem”
effect on localities fearful of treading close to the line and exposing
themselves to costly litigation.240 These are among the reasons why
development agreements or CBAs might be superior options, assuming
they are authorized by state law and assuming the developer agrees to
their terms. After all, a municipality might be able to get more out of a
developer in a development agreement than it permissibly could under

234. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. v.
Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14–15 (N.H. 1981)).
235. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 605 (2013).
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 606; see id. at 612 (holding that these tests also apply to “monetary exactions”);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (“rough proportionality”); Nollan, 483 U.S. at
837 (“essential nexus”).
239. But see Selmi, supra note 6, at 607 (noting that “[s]ome argue that [these] decisions
merely create procedural hurdles that municipalities can readily overcome”).
240. Id. at 606–07 (observing that the Court’s language “spoke powerfully to some local
officials, suggesting that the Court would continue to look unfavorably on local power to impose
requirements on developers”).
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this doctrine, and yet, “by signing the contract the developer would
voluntarily waive any objections.”241
All of that said, however, localities still have meaningful room to
maneuver in the face of developer intransigence, even under the Court’s
holdings. Municipalities “often” permissibly impose exactions in the
forms of “in-kind dedications for infrastructure, such as roads, parks, and
schools, and ‘in-lieu’ fees for the same purpose.”242 They also lawfully
impose “impact fees, or special assessments, to cover the cost of
development” and to “shift to the developer the costs of the public
infrastructure that the development requires.”243 Even as currently
practiced, then, exactions are themselves a form of risk reallocation
because they relieve local government from spending taxpayer money on
infrastructure that may turn out to be a metaphorical bridge to nowhere
in the event of the project’s failure.244 This logic is also another way of
justifying requirements that developers pay for land acquisition costs, as
discussed above.245
But localities can go further. Whereas ordinary small-scale
development that is entirely in the owner’s hands generates little social
risk, and therefore does not justify any exaction designed to mitigate such
risk, large-scale redevelopment projects are quite different. As shown
above, municipalities take significant gambles in these settings.246 And
recall that one of the most significant aspects of local risk is not the
dollars spent themselves, but the opportunity cost they represent.247 Every
taxpayer dollar spent on a development project that fails is a taxpayer
dollar not spent on schools, parks, and other public services. These
localities are therefore forced in the short term to either spend less on
those services or raise taxes to cover the cost, with the risk that failure in
the long term only requires more of the same. But in distressed
communities with small tax bases, raising taxes is often simply not an
241. Id. at 610; see Green, supra note 209, at 394 (noting that development agreements allow
municipalities to gain “public benefits otherwise not obtainable under regulatory takings
doctrine”).
242. Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 23, at 609 (footnote omitted); see Vicki
Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 481 n.42 (1991) (reporting that “at least 89% of all
communities in the United States impose some form of dedication requirement (either of land or
of facilities)” and that “[f]ifty-eight percent require fees-in-lieu-of-dedications or impact fees”).
243. Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 23, at 609.
244. Cf. Been, supra note 242, at 482–83 (explaining that exactions not only serve to shift
costs, but in so doing may “induce a more efficient use” of infrastructure and public resources and
may “prevent the developer from appropriating wealth created by the activities of the local
government”).
245. See supra Section II.A.
246. See supra Part I.
247. See Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 23, at 610 (emphasizing “the
opportunity cost to the community as a result of bestowing the benefit”).
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option. The very undertaking of a large-scale redevelopment project that
involves municipal financing thus almost inevitably means the
contraction of other public services and the risk that even further
contractions will be necessitated in the future.
This reasoning significantly expands the set of exactions a
municipality might consider imposing. That is, there ought to be in many
cases a “nexus” between a project itself and the harm done to public
services by draining them of funding.248 This is not to say that every case
will clear the bar, but at a minimum, many will be stronger than the one
the Court rejected in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,249 where
the exaction demanded was an affirmative easement on the property—a
right of access—yet the harm to the community of the development in
question was primarily visual (blockage of an ocean view) and
“psychological[].”250 An exaction in the form of a roughly proportional
fee to replenish the budget for those services forgone in order to fund the
development therefore ought to be able to pass constitutional scrutiny.251
To be sure, a developer could object that a project’s success will increase
the tax base and therefore provide added funding in the long run for those
same services. This is certainly the goal, and the fact that it might come
to pass requires not assessing the developer for the full extent of the
opportunity cost. But even under the best-case scenario, that expanded
tax base is years in the future, so its present value should be discounted
and the developer made to fill the gap. Moreover, the fact that that bestcase scenario might not come to pass warrants assessing the developer
for the present value of the expected shortfall. Like the other riskreallocation strategies discussed above, such an exaction would result in
a fairer distribution of risk, prevent localities from being left high and
dry, and leave developers with stronger incentives—in the form of more
significant investment—to pursue efficient projects and to avoid failure
in executing them.252
C. Benchmarked and Long-Tailed Incentives
The risk-reallocation strategies discussed so far may not be sufficient
on their own to provide developers with the right incentives if developers
can expect to get paid back for any required financial outlays in the form
248. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (describing the “essential
nexus” that must exist between an exaction’s terms and the harms they seek to prevent).
249. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
250. See id. at 828–29.
251. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
252. See Been, supra note 242, at 489 (“Land use exactions thus serve an important and
legitimate purpose by creating incentives for developers to take the efficient level of precaution
against harm and by forcing developers to consider all costs in determining how much to
develop.”).
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of attractive tax incentives and abatements that have the net effect of
leaving the taxpayers to pay for everything anyway.253 Indeed, the more
risk allocated to developers, the more they are likely to demand precisely
these sorts of rewards. And because municipalities already commonly
offer them, as illustrated in Part I, municipal finance is a necessary
component of any conversation about development projects and taxpayer
risk.
To start, of all the ways in which municipalities take on risk from
development projects, tax abatements and incentives are among the least
bad from a risk-allocation standpoint. This is for the obvious reason that
they at least give developers more motivation to complete their projects.
That is, unlike taxpayer-funded land acquisition, which puts a
municipality on the hook regardless of whether a project delivers on its
promises or even happens at all, and which represents an immediate
benefit to developers with no corresponding obligation, a program of tax
abatements will not provide its greatest benefits to developers until a
project is built and in operation. And in the event of total failure, again in
contrast to land-acquisition costs and the like, the taxpayers do not realize
much if any up-front loss. Moreover, making developers pay for land
acquisition and then permitting them to “recoup” that money through tax
abatements is still better than never making them pay at all because it
allows municipalities to dangle that reimbursement as a reward for
completion of the project. If success is defined narrowly as a completed
project—as opposed to a hole in the ground—tax incentives can help
achieve it.
But as discussed above, that is too limited a conception of success.
Consider Poletown and New London. In both cases, the developers and
local governments both had something to show for their efforts: buildings
were built, companies moved to town, and people were hired. But the
benefits were far from what the taxpayers had been promised. GM created
only half the hoped-for jobs for the people of Poletown.254 In fact, its
project eliminated thousands of existing jobs by displacing existing
businesses, so the net effect on employment was not clearly positive.255
And there was little evidence that the area was in fact revitalized as a
result of the project, so the net effect on the tax base was also not clearly
positive.256 As for Pfizer, it created many jobs, but it only stayed in New
London for ten years—until the expiration of the property tax abatement
it had enjoyed—before moving most of the jobs out of town.257

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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These two cases thus illustrate a separate aspect of the risk-allocation
problem: lack of long-term commitment. Even when developers face the
right financial incentives to complete a project, there is little keeping
them in town and little holding them to implementation promises like
creating jobs, expanding the tax base, or attracting other businesses.
Development agreements and CBAs can create some stickiness for
developers on these fronts, but as discussed, developers may not be
willing to negotiate and can also buy off their counterparties in the event
of breach with side deals and targeted benefits that deter them from
enforcing the agreement.258 Some development agreements might also,
as discussed, face doubts as to their validity under state law.259
Municipalities should therefore phase in any offered tax incentives
over a longer period of time. For example, rather than real estate tax
abatements that apply for the first ten years like those Pfizer enjoyed in
New London, municipalities might offer abatements that do not take hold
until some number of years down the road—or that start off small and
increase over a number of years. Such a structure would balance the city’s
interest in attracting a developer with its interest in keeping the developer
accountable to its vision. It would also save the municipality money on
the front end when it is in fiscal distress, shift its costs to a future in which
the tax base is projected to be healthier, and incentivize the developer to
stay on the premises and see to it that the project works and generates
revenue in the long run. After all, as most retirement plan participants
know, delaying the vesting of benefits in order to secure commitment on
the part of the beneficiary—and in order to limit the losses of the party
extending those benefits in the event the beneficiary does not live up to
its promises—is common.260 The same logic holds in the redevelopment
context.261
But delayed vesting might again lead developers, who naturally
discount future benefits, to demand more generous incentives. There is a
potential win-win solution here, though, and that is explicit performancebased abatements.262 Under one option, the developer might be offered
258. See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 207–10 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FAQS ABOUT RETIREMENT
PLANS AND ERISA 4–5, https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/our-activities/
resource-center/faqs/retirement-plans-and-erisa-compliance.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6FN-QJ7L].
261. Another option could be a municipal threat to claw back any benefits in the event
expectations are not met. See Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation,
and the Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 508–09 (2009). But a resource-strapped city
would still have had to forgo revenue in the short term and then fight to get it back, which could
be costly and time-consuming.
262. Some cities have already employed some version of these in some high-profile settings.
See, e.g., Amazon Selects New York City and Northern Virginia for New Headquarters, ABOUT
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some base amount of tax abatements at the start of the project—which it
would be able to count on regardless of what transpired. But the
municipality could go on to offer a schedule of benchmarks that would
trigger escalated abatements. A simple version could provide an
additional percentage of a rate reduction for every x number of local jobs
created. Under another option, the developer might be invited to share in
the financial benefits of a more robust tax base as an incentive for the
developer to complete the project, create jobs, and attract other businesses
that will contribute to municipal revenue. For example, a city could do as
Mesa, Arizona did in the project discussed in Part I: offer the developer
a percentage of added sales tax revenue for a defined period of time.263
Better still from the city’s revenue perspective, the city could identify its
goals for total tax revenue and start by setting the developer’s abatement
at a low enough level that the city can expect to achieve that goal. The
city would make a binding deal, however, that the more the tax base
expands due to the developer’s efforts, the developer’s tax would be
abated proportionally for some defined amount of time. Again, the
developer would be permitted to directly reap some of the rewards of a
more robust tax base and would thereby be incentivized to expand that
tax base by attracting other businesses, creating more high-paying jobs,
and the like. But compared to Mesa’s approach, this one should be
expected to cost the city much less or, if designed right, even be revenue
neutral.264
All of these approaches, and many others one could imagine, are
superior to the condition-free offers of tax reduction that many
municipalities currently offer to developers.265 This is for the simple
reason that the developer has to deliver in order to get these benefits or
maximize their generosity. Moreover, they do not cost the municipality
anything unless the project is successful. And they result in the developer
recouping its own outlays for land acquisition or other up-front costs only
if the project generates the promised spillover benefits for the
municipality. In this way, the municipality would take on less risk by
making these offers, would satisfy developers’ understandable demands
for rewards commensurate with their new risks, and would do so by
effectively aligning the developers’ interests with its own.
AMAZON (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/amazon-selects-new
-york-city-and-northern-virginia-for-new-headquarters [https://perma.cc/99HC-LN3Z] (announcing
tax incentives with job-creation benchmarks).
263. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
264. This approach is distinguished from maligned programs that divert workers’ income tax
revenue from public services to those workers’ employers. See PHILIP MATTERA, KASIA
TARCZYNSKA, LEIGH MCILVAINE, THOMAS CAFCAS & GREG LEROY, PAYING TAXES TO THE BOSS
3–4 (2012), https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/taxestotheboss_execsum.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MR8T-MNDU].
265. See supra Part I.
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III. IMPLEMENTATION, COORDINATION, AND COOPERATION
Having identified and framed both the neglected risk-allocation
problem and the risk-reallocation potential of takings, land use, and
municipal finance law, it is now necessary to address the serious obstacles
to effective risk reallocation posed by pathologies of local democracy and
of interlocal competition. In other words, there are fairly entrenched
reasons why stories like those set out in Part I keep happening. This Part
sets out that landscape and then pivots to explore both the doctrinal and
theoretical potential of state- and regional-level action designed along the
lines set out in Part II to overcome these pernicious local dynamics.
A. Local Power and Local Obstacles
Local governments in the United States generally operate under one
of three self-governance arrangements. All begin with the premise that
power resides in the first instance in the state government; any power that
a locality exercises must thus be delegated to it by the state.266 Some
states adhere to the traditional arrangement under which those powers
must be expressly delegated seriatim.267 Most, however, operate under
one of two forms of “home rule.” In an imperio home rule arrangement,
localities are delegated “the full police power with respect to municipal
affairs.”268 Alternatively, in a legislative home rule arrangement,
localities are granted “all the powers the legislature could grant, subject
to the legislature’s authority to restrict or deny localities a particular
power or function” at any time; that is, “all powers are granted until
retracted.”269
Some of the steps discussed in Part II are comfortably within general
conceptions of all three of these forms of local power. For example, land
use regulation is widely understood to be a quintessentially local issue as
a descriptive, normative, and legal matter.270 That is, states tend to
delegate the power to regulate land use to localities and that power is
often held to be within the scope of the locality’s municipal affairs.271
Others assume a preexisting local power. For example, while not all
localities have free rein to tax,272 the modified approach to abatements
266. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1990).
267. See id. at 10–11 (observing that nine states do not provide a form of “home rule” to
local governments).
268. Id. at 10.
269. Id.
270. See Michael C. Pollack, Land Use Federalism’s False Choice, 68 ALA. L. REV. 707,
708–09 (2017).
271. See id. (describing the normative commitments underpinning local control of land use).
272. See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENVER U. L. REV. 1241, 1245–46
(2009).
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discussed above assumes a locality with the power to offer the sort of
unrestricted abatements that are common in the redevelopment context.
Still others might, depending on the jurisdiction, require some added
delegation or some loosening of state limits.273
One simple reason why local governments may not be able to
effectuate some of these proposals on their own is the absence of
necessary authority. That alone is reason for action at the state level. But
even assuming a municipality with all the necessary power, action at the
state level is still likely necessary to make these interventions effective
because local governments cannot reasonably be expected to do what it
takes to reallocate the risk of redevelopment failure.
On the one hand, developers know that they have something valuable
and tend to behave accordingly.274 They can often make the credible
threat that they will simply relocate their projects, with all of their
promised benefits, to some other nearby municipality if that other
municipality offers terms that are more generous to the developer.275
Over deterring development is therefore a legitimate concern that any
municipality reasonably might have. That dynamic makes local
policymaking difficult—lest a general policy about, say, land acquisition
costs lead to suboptimal levels of development. A municipality instead
might approach the problem on an ad hoc basis, but as discussed in more
detail below, developers have powerful tools to make ad hoc bargains
come out in their favor as well.
On the other hand, even if developers make no actual threats,
municipalities in distress are still understandably desperate for lifelines.
They know that each of the proposals set out in Part II has the potential
to make a deal less attractive to developers, so in accordance with the
adage that beggars can’t be choosers, desperate municipalities are not
likely in the first instance to drive hard bargains or to set policies ex ante
that insist on these sorts of terms. Local governments are effectively
coerced by their circumstances, their fear of missing out on projects, and
competition with their neighbors into accepting more risk than they ought
273. See Callies & Tappendorf, supra note 206, at 670 (discussing need for state
authorization for development agreements).
274. See, e.g., Derek Thompson, Amazon’s HQ2 Spectacle Isn’t Just Shameful—It Should
Be Illegal, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/
amazons-hq2-spectacle-should-be-illegal/575539/ [https://perma.cc/PPW9-E5MJ] (“Amazon
announced a national beauty contest, in which North American cities could apply to win the honor
of landing the retailer’s second headquarters.”).
275. See Been, supra note 242, at 511 (noting that localities “face[] competitive pressures”
such that “the developer will take, or threaten to take, its capital elsewhere: from the overreaching
community to another community, from the residential market most often affected by exactions
to the commercial market, or from the building market to other forms of investment”); Schragger,
supra note 27, at 332 (“[F]irms play one city or region against another, generating a subsidy race
with dubious welfare effects.”).
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to bear—whether as a matter of general policy or in any individual
development bargain.276 Indeed, one might predict that, in the absence of
some coordinating authority, municipalities would attempt to outbid one
another in a contest of which can take on the most risk and thereby make
itself the most developer-friendly location.277
One way of averting this race to the bottom would be with robust
public opposition. If the voters in a particular community were unwilling
to pay the cost of failure, then they might be expected to exercise their
voices and their votes and demand that local officeholders insist on
shifting risk to the developer by means of some or all of the proposals set
out in Part II—even if it means losing the project.278 This prospect is no
doubt why scholars like William Fischel contend that “[l]ocal
governments are generally responsive to the concerns of their
communities, especially when the issues involve spending their own tax
money” and that “[w]hen using their own resources, [local governments]
do not usually displace their own citizens without strong reasons.”279
But local democracy is unlikely to serve as a reliably effective brake
here for two reasons. The first is timing. Local officials who want to win
reelection need successes to campaign on, so the temptation to deliver a
major investment to one’s constituents is naturally significant. And at the
point when the project is simply full of potential, it is relatively easy to
build a narrative in which one can wave away the risks and the up-front
276. Cf. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937) (observing that states
failed to adopt tax-funded unemployment programs because they were “paralyzed by fear” that,
in “laying such a toll upon their industries, they would place themselves in a position of economic
disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors”).
277. See SCHRAGGER, supra note 135, at 116 (calling “costly inter-local subsidy battles for
mobile capital” a front in the “war to keep high-value capital in”). But see Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1236–44 (1992) (not disputing that
units of government will compete by deregulating in order to attract capital but arguing that the
result ought to be socially optimal where government faces no constraints with respect to taxation
of capital).
278. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 164, at 626 (observing that, because exit is costly, “people
are also motivated to act politically, using ‘voice’ to influence the actions taken by the
municipality”). And indeed, public opinion does sometimes scuttle large-scale development
projects. See, e.g., Caroline Spivack, The Industry City Megadevelopment That Wasn’t, and How
the Deal Fell Apart, CURBED (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.curbed.com/2020/09/industry-cityrezoning-defeated-nyc-development.html [https://perma.cc/3TF3-YH2N] (documenting how
local activists defeated a rezoning effort); Eliza Relman, “Queens is Not for Sale”: Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez and New York Activists Celebrate Amazon’s Decision to Cancel HQ2 in Long
Island City, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 14, 2019, 3:09 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/alexandriaocasio-cortez-celebrates-amazon-hq2-retreat-from-new-york-2019-2
[https://perma.cc/32HX433T] (“Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez celebrated Amazon’s . . . announcement that it would not
build its second headquarters . . . in . . . Queens, New York, as a result of local political
opposition.”).
279. Fischel, supra note 44, at 954.
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costs.280 This dynamic is no doubt part of why municipalities keep taking
the risks they take. To be sure, some voters will be skeptical—especially
those whose property is being condemned or whose jobs will be lost. But
as long as those individuals are relatively few in number, and particularly
if they are not politically powerful, their opposition is unlikely to stand
in the way of reelection.281 Finally, the officials who agree to a project
may reasonably expect that, by the time any failure will become apparent
in the longer run, they will no longer be in power due to retirement or
election to some other office.282 As a result, today’s decisionmakers can
externalize both the costs of a bad decision and the risks of making a bad
decision today to tomorrow’s decisionmakers, who of course have no
vote today.283 The result is that failure and the prospect of failure act only
as weak deterrents for local officials, while the mere promise of success
represents a meaningful electoral advantage.284
The second reason why local democracy is unlikely to produce
efficient and equitable allocations of risk here is somewhat more sinister.
Considering local elected officials as first and foremost “self-interested
maximizers of their chances of reelection,” interest-group theory predicts
that those officials will not act to achieve the public good per se, but to
achieve reelection.285 Insofar as those two impulses point in the same
direction, the difference might be negligible, but they may not point in
the same direction when the benefits of a policy choice inure to a diffuse
majority and the costs are imposed on a concentrated minority with
political influence.286 In that setting, there is a “systematic ‘tendency for
the “exploitation” of the great by the small.’”287 Developers, though
280. See Somin, supra note 11, at 1016, 1023 (noting the short-term political incentives of
supporting and overstating the economic benefits of redevelopment projects)
281. Opposition is also unlikely to materialize because “the alleged public benefit . . . is a
generalized contribution to the local economy that the average citizen cannot readily measure or
even verify the existence of” and the existence of which—or not—“is usually apparent only years
after” the project began. Somin, supra note 11, at 1022.
282. See id. at 1023 (arguing that “a rational, self-interested . . . political leader might well
have been willing to support the Poletown condemnations” despite knowledge that they would
not provide the promised benefits, because “[b]y the time [the failure] became evident to the
public, [the political leader] would probably be out of office”).
283. See supra notes 196–97 and accompanying text (discussing weaknesses in using
political costs to hold local governments accountable).
284. One potential downside to the various proposals set out in Part II is that, by making
projects appear less costly in the short run from the perspective of local government coffers, they
will exacerbate politicians’ myopia and lead them to promote more projects with only superficial
appeal. But if those projects truly are bad investments, those politicians will be unable to find
private development partners willing to assume the risk. See supra notes 185–87 and
accompanying text (discussing the double security of political and market accountability).
285. Levinson, supra note 23, at 374.
286. See id.
287. Id. (quoting MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 3 (1965)).
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smaller in numbers than the broad swath of taxpayers who would benefit
from these risk-shifting policies, are a significant political force
themselves.288 They each stand to lose more than any individual taxpayer
stands to gain, so they are likely to be more motivated to oppose these
measures than a given taxpayer would be motivated to support them.289
And because of collective action problems, those taxpayers are likely to
remain unorganized.290 Moreover, developers have deep pockets that
allow them to lobby powerfully and can contribute to the campaigns of
local officials who support their efforts (or to the opponents of those who
do not).291 They can also shape policies and ad hoc bargains to their
benefit, and they can enter the political fray themselves, advertising to
increase public support of their projects and to move public opinion in
their favor.292 Finally, they can even buy the support of citizens who
might otherwise voice opposition to the project by promising them
targeted benefits in a CBA or voluntarily offering them added
compensation for land acquisition costs.293 One could go a step further
and add outright corruption to the list of reasons why local democracy
might be captured by developers,294 but even these above-board, lawful
interactions between developers and the local political process create an
environment in which that process is unlikely to move aggressively to
reallocate development risk onto the shoulders of developers.

288. See John T. Goodwin, Note, Justice and the Just Compensation Clause: A New
Approach to Economic Development Takings, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 219,
234 (2010).
289. Condemnees, too, are a concentrated group with more at stake than the diffuse body of
taxpayers. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 125, 130–31 (1992) (arguing that powerful property owners will thwart efficient takings
unless they are paid enough to quiet their opposition). But their resources are likely not to match
those of developers—another concentrated group with even more to lose, and with more to spend
to avert that loss. See Goodwin, supra note 288, at 234 (“[T]he targets of economic development
takings generally have few resources relative to the proponents of development plans.”).
290. Levinson, supra note 23, at 374.
291. See Goodwin, supra note 288, at 234 (“Corporations have political influence because
they can afford to pay the best lobbyists for advocating development plans to local governments
and they can afford to provide generous campaign contributions.”).
292. See id.
293. See CMTY. BENEFITS L. CTR., DELIVERING COMMUNITY BENEFITS THROUGH ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A GUIDE FOR ELECTED AND APPOINTED OFFICIALS 6 (2014),
https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/sites/default/files/publications/1114%20PWF%20CBA%20
Handout_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6GS-58MS] (advising elected officials to try to secure
CBA benefits when dealing with land developers).
294. See, e.g., Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A
Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41 (2006)
(“Disparities in legal and financial resources also may cause quid pro quo corruption between
local officials and private developers.”).
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B. State and Regional Coordination
In contrast to action at the local level, state-level risk reallocation,
lawmaking, and coordinating would be on even sounder legal footing and
would avoid many implementation problems while generating only
negligible new ones. It also would not remove local governments from
the negotiating table or eliminate their roles in economic redevelopment.
The first and simplest reason on the doctrinal front is that, in many
states, the legislature may preempt local policymaking without much
limitation.295 Accordingly, in legislative home rule states—where local
power can be retracted by the state—and in jurisdictions that do not enjoy
home rule power at all, there is essentially no general legal obstacle to a
state simply imposing some or all of these risk-reallocation measures.296
An exception arises in some of the imperio home rule jurisdictions with
state constitutions that afford localities immunity from preemption in
defined arenas like “municipal matters.”297 Given that local development
and land use tend to fall under that umbrella,298 there would be a serious
question whether a state could require a locality with such immunity to
adopt against its wishes many of the measures in Part II. But aside from
that handful of jurisdictions, the legal path is fairly clear for state
intervention.
Second, states need not always resort to mandates to achieve these
goals. Just as the federal government sometimes displaces state and local
decisionmaking and sometimes shapes it with deliberative or other
process rules, and just as it sometimes does so by fiat and sometimes with
incentives and conditional spending programs,299 states can also use more
creative tools with respect to municipalities. For example, particularly in
settings like New London where states partner with localities to pursue
redevelopment projects,300 states can condition their involvement and
their financial support on the locality adopting certain of the measures set
out in Part II. These sorts of nudges can bypass local immunity, preserve

295. See, e.g., Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1115–16 (2007)
(explaining how state legislatures can explicitly and implicitly preempt local governments and
how such “intrastate preemption” is a “problematic shadow” over local governments).
296. See supra note 268–68 and accompanying text.
297. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (providing cities and towns with imperio home rule
authority over “local and municipal matters” as well as immunity from preemption in that
ordinances “in such matters shall supersede . . . any law of the state in conflict therewith”).
298. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, 2016 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 177, 183 (2016) (“Courts consider land use to be a paradigmatically ‘local’ matter and
afford local governments wide-ranging home-rule authority with respect to land use.”).
299. See Pollack, supra note 270, at 727–37 (framing these choices in the context of federal
intervention in local land use law).
300. See supra Section I.E.
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local autonomy, and mitigate pushback from local officials wary of being
displaced without sacrificing too much in terms of efficacy.301
Either way, states could take a few concrete steps to advance the
takings, land use, and municipal finance strategies described above. First,
states could require—again, as a mandate or as a condition of state
financial support for projects—that, in any private redevelopment project
of a certain size or financial scope, localities may not exercise the power
of eminent domain unless the developer pays the required compensation
up front. Municipalities would still exercise the power of eminent domain
to the full extent authorized by law—and still decide whether and when
to do so—but developer-paid compensation would help deter pie-in-thesky projects and reduce the number of inefficient development takings.
Property owners and taxpayers alike would also receive some solace in
that they would be protected from some of the risk of the venture failing.
Related steps could include state mandates or conditions that
developers pay all land acquisition costs, including in consensual
transactions. Or that localities demonstrate that they have structured any
tax abatements offered to developers such that they will not result in net
revenue losses. Or that localities secure some number of risk-shifting
binding commitments from developers off of a state-created menu in the
form of a development agreement, CBA, or exaction. Localities would
still take the lead on setting these specific terms and negotiating these
agreements in ways they see fit, but their decisionmaking would be
structured and their ability to assume what should be the developer’s risk
would be minimized.
Finally, where necessary, states can also enable some of the proposals
set out in Part II by expanding local power. For example, states could
more widely authorize municipalities to enter into development
agreements. And if a state were concerned about the scope of such
agreements,302 it could limit some of the authorized terms in these deals
by, say, authorizing only takings agreements or only agreements designed
to obligate developers to bear risk. States could also structure local tax
power in a way that enables localities to use well-structured abatements
as carrots for development.
These forms of state intervention would all be superior to what has
been, thus far, the most common form in a number of states post-Kelo:
prohibiting nearly all development takings.303 For one thing, unlike such
prohibitions, these moves all recognize the real possibility of socially
beneficial redevelopment projects and would preserve their ability to get
off the ground. But for another, many of these bans are actually quite
301. See Pollack, supra note 270, at 749–52 (discussing same in land use context).
302. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional limits).
303. See Berliner, supra note 154, at 84–88.
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ineffective at achieving their stated goals.304 For example, many states do
not prohibit takings for the purpose of remedying blight, and state courts
have in turn interpreted that exception so broadly as to nearly swallow
the rule.305 The result, ironically, is very little regulation of development
takings. The proposals offered here, by contrast, regulate the actual
substance of projects’ financing and risk-allocation, making them likely
to both be better tailored and more effective.
Activity at the state level is also normatively desirable here. As
discussed above, a significant obstacle to localities standing up for
themselves and their taxpayers is their natural and understandable fear
that developers will pass on them and work with localities that are willing
to take on more risk.306 This dynamic is a real problem for any
uncoordinated attempt to discipline redevelopment. States, however, can
make a comparatively more credible threat to developers. While
developers might be happy to choose between Town A and Town B based
only on which offers more generous terms, they are less likely to forgo
development in State A altogether in order to take advantage of more
favorable terms in State B, simply because the consequences are more
dramatic. In addition to the economic costs of abandoning numerous
viable markets, developers would also have to weigh the costs of
sacrificing at a large scale the human capital and other benefits offered
throughout a given territory.307 To take an extreme example, it might be
easy to imagine developers abandoning San Francisco for Oakland or Los
Angeles for Riverside on the margin, but much harder to imagine
developers abandoning California altogether.308 At the very least, it
would take a lot more in the way of costs to cause such flight.309
To be sure, state-level intervention in local policymaking—or outright
preemption of local policy—has come in for criticism when it relates to
politically hot-button issues like civil rights or responses to the COVID-

304. See Somin, supra note 155, at 2115–20.
305. See id. at 2120–31 (discussing broad interpretations of blight loopholes).
306. See supra notes 274–76 and accompanying text.
307. Cf. Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 63, 90–93 (2013) (discussing agglomeration and human capital explanations for
worker mobility to concentrated areas of educated and skilled people).
308. Cf. SCHRAGGER, supra note 135, at 120 (“No matter how low the taxes are in
Anchorage, it is not going to become a banking center that can compete with New York.”).
309. One related concern might be that larger developers absorb these costs and squeeze out
smaller, perhaps more local, developers that cannot afford them. Insofar as supporting local
business is an important component of economic redevelopment, this result might be considered
counterproductive. Cf. infra note 321 and accompanying text (observing that this dynamic might
lead larger developers not to oppose some degree of risk-reallocation). Determining the correct
level of regulation thus requires striking a balance that accounts for considerations like these.
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19 pandemic.310 There are indeed reasons to be concerned about the
political dynamics of state power and its relationship to local democracy
in some of those settings.311 But development risk is not quite such a
setting. To the contrary, for the reasons discussed, it presents a fairly
strong case for preemption on the basis that disuniformity is a structural
obstacle to sound and desirable policy innovations from which
municipalities stand to benefit if only a central authority could resolve
that disuniformity.312
Of course, at some point, a state’s efforts could absolutely go too far
and overdeter developers. The claim here is therefore not that states
should require localities to bear no risk at all, to drive the hardest bargains
in all cases, or to pay no attention to competition from other states. It is
of course crucial for these interventions to be carefully balanced and
tailored. Perhaps municipalities in some states are already doing a
relatively good job of allocating risk such that no intervention is required
there. Perhaps states that already limit the scope of the eminent domain
power beyond the Kelo floor would find changes to tax abatement policy
more effective at allocating risk. And so on. But it is also important not
to overstate the danger of overdeterrence. That objection assumes that the
status quo is or is close to optimal in terms of risk-sharing and the quantity
of development. As Part I sets out, it is hardly clear that either is the case.
Indeed, it is not even clear that it is good for developers in the aggregate
that municipalities bear as much risk as they do. If the misallocation of
risk makes failure more likely, then it makes undeveloped holes in the
ground more likely too. Those failures pull down property values in
surrounding areas and make other projects that might even be successful
more likely to fail or underdeliver due to lack of demand.313 Perhaps some
measure of development deterrence is called for—or is at least a lesser
evil than the risk-free bonanzas developers are too often offered.
310. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 26, at 963–74; Schragger, supra note 26, at 1169–83;
David A. Graham, The Battle for Local Control Is Now a Matter of Life and Death, THE ATLANTIC
(July 26, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/why-states-wont-let-citiessave-themselves/614539/ [https://perma.cc/UQN6-SAB8].
311. See Davidson, supra note 26, at 999–1000 (“At the moment, too many state legislatures
are approaching their responsibility through the lens of partisan politics, with insufficient respect
for local democracy.”).
312. See, e.g., Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 825 (Cal. 2005)
(“[T]he state’s interest in uniformity . . . demonstrably transcends the concerns of a particular
municipality, and is a ‘convincing basis for legislative action . . . based on sensible, pragmatic
considerations.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. City of Los
Angeles, 812 P.2d 916, 926 (Cal. 1991)).
313. Cf. Jonathan H. Adler, Interstate Competition and the Race to the Top, 35 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 89, 91–92 (2012) (“Just as taxpayers and business investment may flee jurisdictions
that impose excessive tax burdens, they may also flee jurisdictions that fail to provide adequate
infrastructure or environmental protection.”).
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One other important concern is that the same interest group politics
that make local adoption of risk-reallocation measures difficult will do
the same at the state level.314 This is a serious problem—implementing
these proposals in the face of developer resistance is a tall order—and
one response might be to propose these measures in a direct referendum
or initiative where authorized.315 But putting that possibility to the side,
the sheer size of state government relative to local government ought to
make interest group capture a relatively more difficult—or at least more
expensive—prospect. Moreover, as James Madison recognized,
concentrated interest groups like developers, which he referred to as
“factions,” tend to be more successful in small polities rather than in large
ones.316 Because of their size alone, Madison suggested, “larger republics
are more likely to contain opponents of a policy who can coalesce and
compete with advocates of the proposal.”317 So, in place of dispersed
taxpayers who might want to see their municipality bear less
redevelopment risk but who lack the resources, clout, and coordination to
make that happen locally, state politics might be more likely to see
property rights, fiscal responsibility, and other good government
advocacy groups saddle up against developer interests.318 The state-level
anti-development responses to Kelo are something of a case in point.319
Moreover, developers themselves might be less hostile to state-level
regulation for two reasons. First, uniformity reduces transaction costs
insofar as developers could make one single adaptation to their business
model instead of numerous ones for each locality’s baroque approach.320
Second, larger developers that already have significant market share in a
given state might support these sorts of measures for the self-interested
goal of boxing out competitors or new market entrants.321

314. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 565–68, 571 (2001) (arguing that environmental groups face
the same or similar obstacles to effective lobbying at the federal level as they do at the state level).
315. See Gillette, supra note 170, at 981 (“[D]ecisions made by legislators may be far more
susceptible to interest group pressure than plebiscitary ones.”). But see, e.g., Christopher S.
Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: On Voter Ignorance and Election Law, 2013
U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 390–92 (arguing that voters are poorly informed in initiative votes).
316. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
317. Clayton P. Gillette, Comment, Interest Groups in the 21st Century City, 32 URB. LAW.
423, 426 (2000).
318. Cf. id. (observing in the federal-versus-local context that, while “[m]anufacturers,
banks, and utilities may have their interest groups that lobby Congress consistently, . . . so do
consumers and labor”).
319. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text.
320. Cf. Revesz, supra note 314, at 573 (“Firms in such industries [with strong economies
of scale] tend to prefer uniform federal regulation to a patchwork of different state standards.”).
321. See id. at 572 (noting that regulated firms might support regulation in order to erect
“barriers to entry that give them an advantage over their competitors”).
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All of that said, these dynamics certainly still remain complicated at
the state level. Some states may simply not be interested in averting these
races to the bottom, and there may be arenas where developer interests
are equally or even better able to organize and oppose risk-reallocation
measures at the state level.322 But at a minimum, the interlocal
competition problem that can be expected to stymie local leadership on
this score likely makes state-level efforts more plausibly successful than
purely local action.
Finally, a potential response to the risk of developers abandoning
Town A for Town B, or State A for State B, is for Towns A and B or
States A and B to band together in a regional cooperative arrangement.
An approach like this might make sense somewhere like the Research
Triangle Area of Raleigh, Durham, and Chapel Hill in North Carolina or
the Tri-State Area of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. After all,
one could easily imagine a developer choosing to develop in northern
New Jersey just across the Hudson River from New York in the event
that New York or New York City refused to bear risks that New Jersey
or Newark was willing to bear. After all, remember that the NYSE project
took shape precisely because of a threat to relocate the trading floor from
Lower Manhattan to New Jersey.323 The same could be true with respect
to choosing Durham over Raleigh, for example. Cooperation across those
jurisdictions would make those threats much less powerful. Of course,
actually achieving that sort of cooperation requires the relevant
governments not to undercut their neighbors along the lines set out
above.324 But there is some cause for optimism that regional cooperation
along these lines could be a real possibility, particularly given that
neighbors are irrevocably interdependent, with fortunes tied to one
another’s success and with no shortage of opportunities to retaliate
tomorrow for today’s defection.325 Indeed, some states have recently
demonstrated their ability to work together in the public interest even at
the potential cost to business by coordinating economic planning in the
face of the COVID-19 pandemic.326 If successful, the positive

322. See Gillette, supra note 317, at 427 (“Some groups may be better able to organize at
more centralized levels, while other groups are better able to organize at a decentralized level.”).
323. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text.
325. See Gillette, supra note 317, at 431–32; Daphne A. Kenyon, Adam H. Langley &
Bethany B. Paquin, Property Tax Incentive Pitfalls, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 1011, 1014–15 (2012)
(discussing metro area agreements to minimize interlocal tax competition).
326. See Marie J. French & Sam Sutton, New York Region Governors Plan Coordinated
Economic Restart, POLITICO (Apr. 7, 2020, 5:52 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-jersey
/story/2020/04/07/new-york-region-governors-plan-coordinated-economic-restart-1273313 [https://
perma.cc/E54G-TR8G].
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coordinating effect at the regional level would achieve similar outcomes
as coordination at the state level.327
The bottom line is simply this: There is at least some amount of risk
reallocation a given municipality can afford to do without scaring off
developers. Insofar as it has the power, it should take that step. Insofar as
it does not, the state should give it that power. There is some likely larger
amount of risk reallocation a state can afford to do without scaring off
developers because it covers a larger territory and has enough to offer in
terms of human capital and other benefits such that a developer is less
likely to abandon it entirely. It should take those steps. There is also some
perhaps even larger amount of risk reallocation a regional or interlocal
cooperative can afford to do, and there are good reasons to consider as
much. Finally, there is a point at each level of government beyond which
the danger of losing efficient development outweighs the potential
benefits of a given risk reallocation measure. That’s where to stop. It
would no doubt be up to officials to find that point as they engage in onthe-ground implementation in their communities and their states, but it
seems safe to say that there is still substantial slack in the line at each
level of government.
CONCLUSION
Economic redevelopment is a critical goal for distressed
municipalities. And in the absence of a magic wand, these municipalities
inevitably must partner with private developers to make it happen. There
is nothing intrinsically wrong with that, but every project risks failing to
launch and even launched projects risk failing to reach their promised
heights. So, while these sorts of partnerships ought to continue, it is
critical for scholars and policymakers to attend, not just to the distribution
of resources in these arrangements, but the distribution of risk. It is
critical from an equity perspective in terms of allocating risk to the party
best situated to bear it, and it is critical from an incentives perspective in
terms of allocating risk to the party best equipped to mitigate it.
At present, it is too often the people who live in these distressed
municipalities who bear the risk despite being least well situated to bear
it and least equipped to mitigate it. But there is significant potential in
takings law, land use law, and municipal finance law for localities, states,
and regional arrangements to reallocate risk to the better-situated and
better-equipped developers. Taking even some of the steps that emerge
from the analysis presented in this Article stands to help economic
redevelopment better achieve its traditional efficiency and justice goals.
327. Insofar as some states do not permit municipalities to enter into interlocal compacts
without state authorization, see, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. IX(1)(c), those states ought to permit or
even incentivize these sorts of cooperative arrangements.
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And spotlighting issues of risk allocation alongside those of resourceallocation stands to help takings, land use, and state and local government
scholarship better understand and evaluate the forces at play in municipal
development.

